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REVISITING A JURISPRUDENCE OF OBLIGATION
Ariel Evan Mayse*
Kenneth A. Bamberger**
ABSTRACT
Through his landmark exploration of obligation as the
conceptual touchstone of what he describes as the “Jewish
jurisprudence of the social order,” Robert Cover offered an alternate
language for legal regimes grounded in a rhetoric of individual rights.
The present essay revisits Cover’s account of the socially
embedded nature of law and juridical process, taking seriously both its
claims, as well as the cautions of its critics. The essay thus neither
abandons the concept of rights as key to jurisprudence nor seeks to
present a naïve or romantic characterization of Jewish legal thought,
and proceeds wary of the pitfalls inherent in such comparative efforts.
At the same time, it argues that Cover’s primary insight regarding the
notion of a socially imbricated obligation as a core feature of Jewish
jurisprudence and provides an important contribution. This theory is
especially valuable in contexts in which contemporary policymakers
and advocates have lacked success in locating a language or strategy
sufficient to appreciate and address overwhelming modern problems
at the juncture of individual and community.
More specifically, drawing on our previous work exploring
Jewish law lessons for information privacy and environmental ethics,
this essay argues that a nuanced adaptation of Cover’s theory of
“incumbent obligation” as the organizing feature of Jewish law, can
provide contemporary policymakers with a set of conceptual tools to
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help develop alternative approaches to metastatic surveillance and
environmental collapse.
The notion of obligation as the heart of an ethical and
jurisprudential system provides a powerful corrective to the postEnlightenment West’s centering of the “individual moral adventure”
and the privileging of individual rights that has gone hand-in-hand with
this ethos. The pre-modern roots of halakhah (Jewish law) permit a
powerful challenge to this paradigmatic hegemony, as the Jewish legal
tradition precedes liberalism and thus predates conceptions of the
individual that undergird much of modern thinking, even as Jewish
jurisprudence embodies a deep commitment to protecting individuals.
Engagement with this tradition need not supplant liberalism. Rather,
it presents a complementary ethical framework that can work within
and enrich post-Enlightenment Western discourse. Reflecting this
opportunity, revisiting Cover’s work provides a conceptual frame that
is sufficiently flexible and capacious to provide an additional legal
vocabulary and set of jurisprudential values that can help confront the
greatest challenges of our age.
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INTRODUCTION

Through his landmark exploration of obligation as the
conceptual touchstone of what he describes as the “Jewish
jurisprudence of the social order,”1 Robert Cover offered an alternate
language for legal regimes grounded in a rhetoric of individual rights.
“The basic word of Judaism,” Cover wrote, “is obligation or mitzvah,”
a notion “intrinsically bound up” in “a myth of Sinai[,]” while “the
myth of social contract is essentially a myth of autonomy,” he
contrasts, the myth of Sinai is “collective-in-deed, a corporateexperience.”2 “The experience at Sinai is not chosen. The event gives
forth the words which are commandments.” 3
Accordingly, Cover suggested that a jurisprudence shaped by
social obligation could offer a corrective for the shortcomings of a
jurisprudence of rights. While the latter possesses profound rhetorical
heft “[w]hen the issue is restraint upon power,” it “has proved
singularly weak in providing for the material guarantees of life and
dignity flowing from community to the individual.”4 By contrast,
Cover described, “[i]n a jurisprudence of mitzvoth [obligations], the
loaded, evocative edge is at the assignment of responsibility.” 5 This
conception, Bill Eskridge explained, “provides a richer understanding
of the relationship between the individual and the community than
does liberal theory,” for “individual rights, without more, are a thin
way to express or normalize” that relationship. 6
Cover linked this emphasis on obligation to what he saw as
another critical and distinguishing feature of Jewish legal discourse:
the objective or telos of the law. Drawing upon the writings of
Maimonides, the great medieval jurist, Cover argued that Jewish legal
sources understand Jewish law (halakhah) as formative of the
1

See Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5
J.L. & RELIGION 65 (1987).
2
Id. at 66.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 71.
5
Id. at 72. This sentiment is found in the repercussive essay by Robert Cover, Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12-13 (1983), discussed in Suzanne L. Stone, In
Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary
American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 830 (1993).
6
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and Rights of
Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2001) (crediting the idea to Cover and
Susan Koniak).
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practitioner’s moral and intellectual development, through its capacity
to shape human behavior in the context of a rich and multivocal
network of shared social and religious duties. 7 “[T]o be one who acts
out of obligation,” he explained, “is the closest thing there is to a
Jewish definition of completion as a person within the community.” 8
The Jewish “jurisprudence of the social order”9 thus embraces the
sanctity of the individual, while at the same time imposing
responsibility on each community member to ensure the collective
behavior necessary for a vibrant, functioning, and good society.
Cover’s framing of a jurisprudence of obligations as an
alternative to one grounded in rights is often lauded for providing a
rich account of the socially embedded nature of law and juridical
process.10 Yet Cover’s theory is not without significant discontent,
and his evaluation of halakhah and its paradigmatic uses for American
jurisprudence have drawn critique. Suzanne Last Stone, for example,
has interrogated Cover’s views and argued that his “tendency to overly
romanticize Jewish law also mars his turn to the contrast case as a
prescription for American society.” 11 Stone suggests that “Cover
apparently concluded that a reconception of law as obligation, rather
than rights, would partially answer his central concern: the problem of
the law's violence.”12 Yet, she argues, Cover actually significantly
overstates “the lack of coercive forces in Jewish law,”13 and somewhat
rose-tinted portrayal of halakhah thus elides foundational dimensions
of Jewish law that embody and flex its coercive and even violent
potential.14 These elements of halakhah dealing with compulsion,
though less prominent in its medieval and modern literatures, trouble

7

Cover, supra note 1, at 70.
Id. at 67.
9
Id., at 65.
10
Eskridge, Jr., supra note 6, at 1722; ELLIOT N. DORFF, FOR THE LOVE OF GOD AND
PEOPLE: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAW 9 (2007); ELLIOT N. DORFF, TO DO THE
RIGHT AND THE GOOD: A JEWISH APPROACH TO MODERN SOCIAL ETHICS 19 (2002);
see also Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look at American
Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a Perspective of Jewish Law and
Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 165, 168-69, (2007) (proposing that legal ethics codes
incorporate Jewish Law’s notion of obligation).
11
Stone, supra note 5, at 870.
12
Id. at 830.
13
Id. at 867-68.
14
Id. at 824.
8
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Cover’s thesis precisely because they are hardly ancillary to the Jewish
legal tradition.
Stone further demonstrates that Cover’s “treatment of the
Jewish jurisprudence of obligations omits any discussion of how two
of Judaism's most basic religious ideals, to serve God and to emulate
God, intersect with the notion of law as obligation.”15 In other words,
to a certain degree, Cover has omitted or ignored the fundamentally
religious dimension of halakhah while employing Jewish law as a foil
and a challenge to the secular American legal tradition. This religious
component and context, argues Stone, cannot so easily be done away
with. Finally, Stone maintains that “[t]he Jewish legal example fails
Cover because a community of obligation does not imply particular
moral or political ideals.”16 Such obligations, even when socially
grounded and communally oriented, do not ipso facto yield a particular
set of values or ethical principles. Much as a jurisprudence based
solely upon rights is impoverished, Stone argues that the moral
dimensions of obligation remain opaque and ill-defined if the law’s
structures and vocabularies are not complemented by broader ethical
frameworks—as they are in the native Jewish context.17
Attempting to defend the concept of rights as a formidable
moral, social and jurisprudential force, Martha Minow engages
Cover’s theory from a different angle. 18 She rejects the assumption
that rights solely implicate the domain of the individual, suggesting
that they, too, are situated within a nested constellation of social
values. Minow defines rights, in part, as the “enforceable claims of
individuals or groups against the state,” 19 but is careful to extend this
umbrella to cover all claims “that muster people’s hopes and articulate
their continuing efforts to persuade” 20 even if they have not been
formally declared. Because, claims Minow, these values and “hopes,”
are elucidated, codified, and made enforceable through the processes
of legal interpretation, the foundational concept of rights ought
therefore to be seen as by no means inadequate or impotent for the

15

Id. at 867.
Id. at 871.
17
Id. at 823.
18
See Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860 (1987).
19
Id. at 1866.
20
Id. at 1867.
16
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law’s task of guiding human relationships and shaping the moral
interactivity of a society.
Such important correctives to Cover’s reading of obligation
within the Jewish legal tradition are well taken. The present essay
neither abandons the concept of rights as key to jurisprudence 21 nor
seeks to present a naïve or romantic characterization of Jewish legal
thought, and we are wary of the pitfalls inherent in such comparative
efforts. It argues, however, that Cover’s primary insight regarding the
notion of a socially imbricated obligation as a core feature of Jewish
jurisprudence remains an important contribution, especially in contexts
in which contemporary policymakers and advocates have lacked
success in locating a language or strategy sufficient to appreciate and
address overwhelming modern problems at the juncture of individual
and community. Accordingly, drawing on our previous work
exploring Jewish law lessons for information privacy and
environmental ethics,22 this essay engages with Cover and his
interlocutors to explore how Judaism’s conceptual and doctrinal
approaches rooted in obligation might suggest ways to chart new paths.
We have described elsewhere the ways that notions of
individual “rights to be left alone” and “informational selfdetermination”—central to the modern approach to privacy
protection—“offer little defense against the rampant data collection
aggregation and use that have increasingly come to define our big-data
age.23 In the social-personal struggle over what Shoshana Zuboff has
described as “surveillance capitalism,” the individual is poorlyoutfitted within the matrix of American law. 24 Current legal and policy
discourse, moreover, struggles to overcome a form of technological
determinism by which capacity to surveille constrains the breadth of
rights not to be surveilled, or to fully conceive the totality and severity
of harms wrought by pervasive surveillance and data analytics. 25 If
Indeed, Cover himself recognized that “[s]inai and social contract both have their
place” in “[t]he struggle for universal human dignity and equality.” See Cover, supra
note 1, at 73.
22
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Ariel Evan Mayse, Pre-Modern Insights for PostModern Privacy: Jewish Law Lessons for the Big Data Age, 36 J.L & RELIGION 1
(2021); Ariel Evan Mayse, Where Heaven and Earth Kiss: Jewish Law, Moral
Reflection and Environmental Ethics, 5 J. JEWISH ETHICS 68 (2019).
23
Bamberger & Mayse, supra note 22, at 1.
24
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 360 (2019).
25
Bamberger & Mayse, supra note 22, at 8.
21
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privacy is, as is often claimed, a fundamental human right, it is often
an empty one that lacks meaningful legal protection. By contrast,
Jewish law’s obligation-based doctrines offer an alternative model that
could shift the focus from privacy as a negative right to the ways it
positively enhances communal value,26 and provide a language of
social relations and the bilateral behaviors they require rather than
placing the individual in opposition to society with privacy as a shield.
An obligation orientation rooted in the social order can also
offer a missing language for current discourse regarding global climate
change and the impending environmental disaster. “In that global
warming poses a powerful challenge to the idea that the free pursuit of
individual interests always leads to the general good,” writes Amitav
Ghosh, “it also challenges a set of beliefs that underlies a deeply rooted
cultural identity, one that has enjoyed unparalleled success over the
last two centuries.”27 Responses grounded in starting points of liberal
and market individualism have failed to generate the collective action
necessitated by the moral and existential crisis manifest in extreme
weather events, loss of biodiversity, depletion of fisheries, pollution of
air, water, and soil, prolonged droughts, and mass extinction of
species. Moreover, attempts to protect the environment by describing
the interests of the non-human world in a language of legal “rights”
explains Peter Burdon, simply redirects attention from the source of
the harm, “offer[ing] a minimalist alternative to environmental justice
claims [that] can be accommodated within the parameters of extractive
capitalism.”28 “The problem,” he observes, “is with us and we need to
place human power at the center of our legal and ethical frameworks.
One way to do this is through obligations.” 29 Here again, an
obligations-based jurisprudence of social order provides a framework
for shifting from a starting point of technological capacity and
economic advancement to one that focuses on the capacity and

26

Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 431 (2016) (“Instead of trying to protect us against bad
things, privacy rules can be used to create good things, like trust.”).
27
AMITAV GHOSH, THE GREAT DERANGEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
UNTHINKABLE 134 (2016).
28
Peter D. Burdon, Obligations in the Anthropocene, 31 L. & CRITIQUE 309, 310
(2020).
29
Id. at 311.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/16

8

Mayse and Bamberger: Revisiting a Jurisprudence of Obligation

2022 REVISITING A JURISPRUDENCE OF OBLIGATION

2123

institutions of human actors, which keeps pace with our ability to
impact and harm the biosphere. 30
A nuanced adaptation of Cover’s theory of “incumbent
obligation” as the organizing feature of Jewish law, can provide
contemporary legal scholars with a set of conceptual tools for thinking
through these issues of metastatic surveillance and environmental
collapse. The notion of obligation as the heart of an ethical and
jurisprudential system provides a powerful corrective to the postEnlightenment West’s centering of the “individual moral adventure” 31
and the privileging of individual rights that has gone hand-in-hand with
this ethos. The pre-modern roots of halakhah permit a powerful
challenge to this paradigmatic hegemony, as the Jewish legal tradition
precedes liberalism and thus predates conceptions of the individual
that undergird much of modern thinking, even as Jewish jurisprudence
embodies a deep commitment to protecting individuals. Engagement
with this tradition need not supplant liberalism, rather, it presents a
complementary ethical framework that can work within and enrich
post-Enlightenment Western discourse. Such an effort, in fact, reflects
a particular Jewish flavor of Enlightenment thought, reflected by
philosopher Moses Mendelssohn: “Every individual is obliged to use
a part of his capacities and of the rights acquired through them for the
benefit of the society of which he is a member.” 32 Revisiting Cover’s
work provides a conceptual frame that is sufficiently flexible and
capacious to provide an additional legal vocabulary and set of
jurisprudential values that can help confront the greatest challenges of
our age.
II.

FRAMING
A.

Translating a Jewish Jurisprudence of Obligation

Jewish law is, in a sense, a conversation across the generations;
it is a discourse spurred by specific questions and cases embedded in
30

JOSHUA A. T. FAIRFIELD, RUNAWAY TECHNOLOGY: CAN THE LAW KEEP UP 18
(2021); FRANK PASQUALE, NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN
EXPERTISE IN THE AGE OF AI 171 (Harvard Univ. Press 2020).
31
GHOSH, supra note 27, at 127.
32
MOSES MENDELSSOHN, JERUSALEM: OR ON RELIGIOUS POWER AND JUDAISM 57
(Brandeis Univ. Press eds., Allan Arkush trans., 2017) (1783). Moses Mendelssohn
(1729–86) was a Jewish philosopher whose works were foundational to the Jewish
Enlightenment.
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time and place, but which is driven by a jurisprudential dialogue across
time and across geography, spanning from ancient Israel to every place
that Jews have lived. 33 While many doctrines regarding privacy and
the environment drawn from this discourse might appear to have ready
comparisons in Western jurisprudence, the animating principles
reflected in their scope and implementation reveal very different
understandings of harms and methods for safeguarding against them.
Jewish law, we argue, offers a fundamentally different vision of the
individual’s role in society and the network of shared obligations that
reflect and support that role.
Rather than seeking to enact legislation from these antique and
medieval sources, our goal is to “think with” the sources of Jewish law
as ethical, philosophical, and jurisprudential prompts, thus, allowing
them to enrich and to challenge a liberal mindset that often has neither
the values nor the vocabulary to deal with these problems. 34
Accordingly, we seek not to simply gather and collate sources in an
attempt to prove that privacy or environmental stewardship are ancient
Jewish values, rather, we acknowledge and embrace the constructive
dimensions of our project. Our quest is not to articulate the putative
original meaning of Jewish jurisprudential discourse, but, in the words

33

For more extensive explorations of the Jewish legal system, see MOSHE
HALBERTAL, PEOPLE OF THE BOOK: CANON, MEANING, AND AUTHORITY (1997);
MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (Bernard Auerbach
& Melvin J. Sykes, trans., 1994); CHAIM N. SAIMAN, HALAKHAH: THE RABBINIC
IDEA OF LAW (2018).
34
We take seriously the reality that Jewish legal discourse is a particular
jurisprudential voice, meant to govern a particular community. See Stone, supra note
5, at 821 (pointing out that American legal theorists frequently paint Jewish law
removed from “the Jewish legal system's internal understanding of its tradition”).
And we recognize the necessity in the comparative law project for appreciating those
particularities when exploring new resonances and ideas. Cf. Michael Walzer,
Nation and Universe, in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 509, 509 (1989)
(discussing Judaism’s “particularist creed” as “one of the chief sources of two
universalisms”). Thus, we seek to recognize the “Jewish legal system's own frame
of reference”–including the “spiritual underpinnings” of the legal discourse
implicating privacy, while at the same time deriving jurisprudential lessons that
might inform different legal systems and contexts. Stone, supra note 5, at 822. See
generally Samuel J. Levine, Applying Jewish Legal Theory in the Context of
American Law and Legal Scholarship: A Methodological Analysis, 40 SETON HALL
L. REV. 933, 936-37 (2010) (emphasizing derivation of jurisprudential lessons from
Jewish law rather than attempts to transplant substantive doctrines into American
law).
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of Karl N. Llewellyn, to highlight “the sense which can be quarried
out of it in the light of the new situation.”35
Translating Jewish jurisprudence for the contemporary legal
context is an act of selection, and we recognize that not all the strands
of thought can—or should—be highlighted or brought into this
dialogue. Reading the Jewish tradition with care and attention to these
potential pitfalls, however, permits us to draw upon the concepts and
vocabulary of halakhah in order to mount a powerful challenge to
contemporary worldviews by offering an alternative mode of
constructing toothsome legal obligations intended to cabin
surveillance and protect the environment.
Following what has often been called the “interpretive turn” in
law,36 and with an eye to Cover’s theory of jurisgenesis and “the
creation of legal meaning,”37 further suggests expanding and
rethinking the narratives that are integrated as animating forces within
these conversations regarding regulation and obligation. In the Jewish
context, this means serious and deep engagement with the vast realm
of narrative, or non-legal, teachings within its canon (called
aggadah).38 Drawing upon rabbinic law to address contemporary
ethical concerns enables, and perhaps even demands, that our reading
of these jurisprudential sources be guided by the rich trove of mythic,
theological, and philosophical narratives found both within and
without the Jewish tradition.39 The rabbi and philosopher David
Hartman argued that “the development of the halakhah must be
subjected to the scrutiny of moral categories that are independent of

35

Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).
36
Minow, supra note 18, at 1861; see also id. at n.3 (defining interpretive turn).
37
Cover, supra note 5, at 11.
38
ABRAHAM ISAAC KOOK, THE LIGHTS OF PENITENCE, THE MORAL PRINCIPLES,
LIGHTS OF HOLINESS, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND POEMS 196-98 (Ben Z. Bokser trans.,
1978); AVINOAM ROSENAK, THE PROPHETIC HALAKHAH: RABBI A.I.H. KOOK’S
PHILOSOPHY OF HALAKHAH (2007); HAYYIM NAHMAN BIALIK, Halachah and
Aggadah, in REVEALMENT AND CONCEALMENT: FIVE ESSAYS 45, 45-87 (Zali
Gurevitc ed., Ibis ed. 2000); ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, GOD IN SEARCH OF MAN:
A PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM 320-47 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux eds., Stratford Press
1955); see also BARRY S. WIMPFHEIMER, NARRATING THE LAW: A POETICS OF
TALMUDIC LEGAL STORIES (Univ. Pa. Press 2011); MOSHE SIMON-SHOSHAN,
STORIES OF THE LAW: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORITY IN THE MISHNAH (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
39
Cover, supra note 5, at 23-24 n.66.
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the notion of halakhic authority.”40 The aggadah often provides a
voice of challenge, sensing insufficiencies in the law and exploring the
ways in which halakhah may be formulated in a manner that is unfair
and even cruel.41 Such narrative traditions thus push beyond the vision
of Jewish law as an isolated, formalistic and totalizing system with
internal principles that operate independently of all other values.
Given that obligations are triggered by and reflected in social
relationships, the network of interpersonal demands that are explored
in the aggadah offers a different but equally important vantage point.
Privacy and environmental law are, of course, well-developed
subfields in American legal scholarship. Other than the gravitas of
hoary antiquity, which is not altogether a good thing, what can turning
to religious laws developed across the past millennia that modern
secular law cannot? Since the early 1970s, many democratic countries
have developed robust laws whose aim is to protect the environment
and the non-human forms of life within the natural world. Yet the past
decade has revealed these laws’ fragility. 42 Their interpretation and
enforcement are subject to changes in government, as well as the
economic interests and lobbying efforts of major corporations and
industries. Regulation is often piecemeal and halfhearted, subject to
many of the same economic pressures and personal interests that have
shaped the laws’ initial—and often inadequate—formulation. More
fundamentally, current approaches to environmental protection do not
reflect the capacity to alter basic paradigms in ways that address the
most environmentally harmful forms of economic development. 43
40

DAVID HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT: THE INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN TRADITIONAL
JUDAISM 98 (Collier MacMillan Pub. Inc. 2010).
41
See the famous midrash about Daniel the tailor, quoted in STEVEN GREENBERG,
WRESTLING WITH GOD AND MEN: HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE JEWISH TRADITION 21112 (Univ. Wis. Press 2004). See the exploration of this topic by Professor David
Halivni, Can a Religious Law be Immoral?, in PERSPECTIVES ON JEWS AND JUDAISM:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WOLFE KELMAN 165, 165-70 (Arthur A. Chiel ed., 1978);
GORDON TUCKER, GOD, THE GOOD, AND HALAKHAH 365-67 (1989); Moshe Silberg
& Amihud I. Ben Porath, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 306, 306 (1961).
42
See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 3-4 (Yale Univ. Press 2010) (discussing the
legislation and scholarly literatures discussed therein).
43
See the critique in FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (New Press
2004). See also MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2008).
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These legal settings cannot give us a language for the collective selfdestruction of humanity, nor can it shift our understanding of basic
responsibility and obligations as applying to both the human and the
non-human world.44
Modern approaches to privacy protection are similarly
circumscribed. Current legislation has not sought to place widespread
substantive limits on information collection, aggregation, and use in
ways that transform the power dynamic of surveillance capitalism.
Nor does it reflect a deep appreciation of the profound individual
vulnerability wrought from the inseparability of data and person,
space, and information. Rights-based frameworks have not developed
a robust sense of the positive dimension of privacy as a communal
value rather than a shield for individual concerns. As scholars,
advocates and policymakers struggle to develop alternative, or
additional, frameworks for comprehending and protecting these issues
in this technological moment, then, we suggest that the literatures of
Jewish law offer both source-material and conceptual guidance for that
project.
B.

Valuing the Religious Roots of an Obligations
Framework

We look to these traditions while remaining committed to the
notion of Jewish law—and its co-constructive narratives—as a
religious discourse; in that sense this project engages in what might
best be described as a post-secular approach to legal scholarship. The
importance of mobilizing the voices of religious law and philosophy
in such conversations goes beyond motivating compliance. 45
“[R]eligious worldviews” for example, argues Amitav Ghosh, “are not
subject to the limitations that have made climate change such a
challenge for our existing institutions of governance.” 46 Religious
communities and their network of obligations extend beyond the
confines of modern nation-states and their territorial boundaries,
affording an opportunity for collective action on a massive scale as
44

Daniel C. Etsy, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental
Regulation to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 ENV’T. L. 1, 77-80 (2017).
45
See ANNA GADE, MUSLIMS ENVIRONMENTALISMS: RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL
FOUNDATIONS (Columbia Univ. Press 2019); JAMES MILLER, CHINA’S GREEN
RELIGION: DAOISM AND THE QUEST FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (Columbia Univ.
Press, 2017).
46
GHOSH, supra note 27, at 158.
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well as a robust way of conceiving of obligations toward future
generations.47 Religious literatures and rituals represent alternative
modes of ethical reasoning and value assignment that offer an
alternative to current economic systems. “[I]t is impossible to see any
way out of the crisis without an acceptance of limits and limitations,
and this in turn, is I think, intimately related to the idea of the sacred,
however one may wish to conceive of it.” 48 The noted scholar and
philosopher Moshe Halbertal has argued that classical Jewish legal
sources define objects, spaces and times as “holy” if they are
essentially beyond the pale of human instrumentalization and thus
cannot be used for extractive, personal or material benefit. 49 A
conception of sacredness of the non-human world, or the expansive
personhood negatively impacted by surveillance, would thus trigger
obligations of limit-setting, responsibility, and connection.
Stone correctly identifies the shortcomings in Cover’s account
regarding the concept of duty, yet, in our estimation, this is an
opportunity for reconsidering obligation from a post-secular
perspective. Religious systems of law, including that of Judaism
generally rooted their authority in God’s sovereignty, 50 but they do not
necessarily thereby relinquish interpretative autonomy in favor of
submission to the dicta of a divine lawgiver. “[T]he subject of the
commands, the ordinary legal person,” writes Arthur J. Jacobson
regarding religious theories of law, “is God’s partner in lawmaking.”51
Within this framing of religious duties, then, the human being is tasked
with an active role in formulating the law and determining the contours
of obligation. As the legal theorist and scholar Richard J. Mouw has
suggested, a mature vision of religious duty approaches “the Godhuman relationship as a covenantal partnership that is characterized by
trust, mutual respect, responsible obedience, and a free acceptance of

47

Edith B. Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L. L. 198, 201 (1992).
48
GHOSH, supra note 27, at 158.
49
Moshe Halbertal, On Holiness, in BORDERS OF SANCTITY: IN ART, SOCIETY AND
JEWISH THOUGHT 30, 30-34 (Emily Bilski et al. eds., 2003) (in Hebrew); Erin L.
O’Donnell, At the Intersection of the Sacred and the Legal: Rights for Nature in
Uttarakhand, India, 30 J. ENV’T L. 135, 141 (2018).
50
Stone, supra note 5, at 868-69; Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 877 (1989); see also Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish
Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 306 (1961).
51
Jacobson, supra note 50, at 894.
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obligation.”52 This conception of law as an expression of relationship,
indeed of partnership, is visible throughout Jewish tradition but is
perhaps best illustrated by the rabbinic adage: “A judge who renders
judgment that aligns with truth in its deepest sense, even for a single
moment, is considered the blessed Holy One’s partner in the works of
creation.”53 Rather than insisting on fealty to divine fiat, as in the
theories of Carl Schmitt, such flexible visions of religious duty
imagine compliance as emerging from a host of social, intellectual, and
theological values other than external enforcement or individual moral
choice.54
Cover observes that, frequently, “[s]ocial movements in the
United States organize around rights.” 55 But conceptions of the
individual’s right to be shielded from harm, whether auditory or visual
intrusion or ecological degradation, remain insufficient for prompting
collective action. Jewish literatures often homiletically interpret the
term mitsvah (“commandment”) as linked to the Aramaic word tsavta
(“connection” or “togetherness”), reflecting a belief that the
commandments bind one to God but also, as duties that reflect and
reify a shared set of values that shape the society as a whole, these
statuses bind the individual to the broader community of practice.
Here, then, we have a quintessentially Jewish precedent for Milner S.
Ball’s proposal of “law as medium-law as connecting rather than
disconnecting, enhancing a flow of dialogue, containing the dynamics
of life in common.”56
There is an additional question at the heart of our project: When
a society is faced with radical and unprecedented changes in
technological, social, economic, and environmental spheres, how can
one look to religious law? As a society and perhaps as a species, we
have reached an inflection point that appears gordian in complexity
and scope. Our hungers for expansion and extraction have led us to
the brink of environmental collapse, as well as pervasive incursions
against privacy and personhood. Might, then, these background
52

RICHARD J. MOUW, THE GOD WHO COMMANDS: A STUDY IN DIVINE COMMAND
ETHICS 18 (1990).
53
Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 10a.
54
ELLIOT N. DORFF, FOR THE LOVE OF GOD AND PEOPLE: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH
LAW 131-88 (Jewish Pub. Soc’y eds., 2007).
55
Cover, supra note 1, at 67.
56
MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 122
(Univ. Wis. Press eds., 1985).
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developments, and evolving concerns about them, be understood as
sort of “constitutional moments” for Jewish law—a precipitating series
of events, with effects on relations between the constituent community,
so extraordinary as to require revisiting Jewish sources for their
wisdom, while extending and emboldening jurisprudential traditions
in light of the unparalleled circumstances of our day.
A mindset of crisis, however, does not spur individuals or
societies to reinterpret and reevaluate their moral, economic, and legal
frameworks. Such paradigms of emergency or catastrophe may lead
to fearful conservatism and the utter rejection of change on one hand,
or, on the other, to bewildered paralysis and recalcitrant indecision.
Both of these eventualities would hamper our efforts to think through
the challenges of climate change or the big-data age, and in fact they
have already done so. Kyle Whyte, a scholar of Environmental Studies
whose work engages deeply with Indigenous traditions, has
demonstrated the inadequacy of “[e]pistemologies of crisis” 57 for
confronting climate change. When faced with seismic environmental
shifts that threaten our ways of life, societies and their laws all too
often fall back on the very tools and structures that brought them to
that point. Whyte presents an alternative in what he describes as
“epistemologies of coordination”—namely, “ways of knowing the
world that emphasize the importance of moral bonds—or kinship
relationships—for generating the (responsible) capacity to respond to
constant change in the world.”58
Rabbinic Judaism, born of a crucible following the destruction
of the Temple, has survived numerous upheavals that might rightly be
called constitutional moments; these have, in fact, often generated a
flurry of legal creativity manifest in the dialectically locked impulses
of codification and commentary. 59 The writing of Cover on issues of
obligation, in turn, might offer a substantive foundation regarding how
to go about reexamining the wisdom of Jewish law in order to think
through critical times but without falling into a worldview of crisis.
His work steers us toward such “epistemologies of coordination” as a
potential avenue for responding to the massive dangers of big data and
looming environmental disaster. Without romantically assuming that
57

Kyle Whyte, Against Crisis Epistemology, in HANDBOOK OF CRITICAL
INDIGENOUS STUD. 52, 53 (A. Moreton-Robinson et al. eds., 2021).
58
Id.
59
ISADORE TWERSKY, INTRODUCTION TO THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES 62-74 (Judah
Goldin et al. eds., 1980); Halbertal, supra note 49, at 57-61, 75.
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halakhah has all the answers needed to address these staggeringly
complicated issues, we are seeking to understand what we ought to
glean from Jewish jurisprudence in order to overcome tired paradigms
and, as Ludwig Wittgenstein would have it, “to show the fly the way
out of the fly-bottle.”60
III.

SEEKING ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES THROUGH A
MINDSET OF OBLIGATION: JEWISH LAW LESSONS FOR
PRIVACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A.

Big Data, Surveillance and Privacy as a Social
Obligation61
1.

Rights-Based Approaches to the Age of Big
Data

Modern American privacy law has been rooted in the discourse
of individual rights since its origins. Seeking to revive legal vitality in
the face of a transformational moment in intrusive technological
capacity—notably the development of photography—Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis in 1890 mined both common law doctrine and its
understandings about what they termed a principle of “inviolate
personality”62 to weave a coherent modern legal vision of privacy
protection.63 This protection, framed as an actionable “right” of the
individual “to be let alone,”64 placed in that individual the power to
determine “the extent to which his or her written work, thoughts,
sentiments, or likeness could be given to the public.” 65
Scholars, courts, and policymakers have debated the contours
of this framing, as well as the interests a privacy right should protect,
60

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 309 (Basil Blackwell
ed., 3d ed. 2001).
61
The following section is based upon Bamberger and Mayse, supra note 22, at 5860.
62
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205 (1890).
63
Id. at 206-07.
64
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Chi.: Callaghan & Co., 2d ed. 1888);
see also Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 NW. U.L. REV. 216, 216
(1960).
65
JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE
OF TECHNOLOGY 15 (1997).
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and the harms it should prevent. Commentators from a range of
disciplines have documented the shortcomings of this approach in the
face of the even greater technological rupture of the digital age. Yet
the fundamental elements of the formulation—designating the
individual as both the determinant of the contours of privacy’s scope
and the mechanism for its legal protection—have demonstrated
powerful normative and legal force for more than a century.
The conceptualization of privacy as a civil liberty has shaped
both the emphasis of subsequent policy discussion, and the articulation
of the values privacy is understood to protect. The first, Priscilla Regan
describes, “has been on achieving the goal of protecting the privacy of
individuals rather than curtailing the surveillance activities of
organizations.”66 Accordingly, the second, in prominent articulations,
include important individual values such as personal autonomy,
emotional release, self‐evaluation, and the ability to limit and protect
personal communication.67 The absence of a privacy “right” –the
“claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others,” undermines one’s individuality and “core
self,” allowing exposure to the dignitary harms of ridicule and shame,
and the threat of control by others who possess one's secrets. 68
Legal protections rooted in notions of individual rights to “be
left alone,”69 and to “informational self-determination,”70 however,
increasingly offer little insurance against technological capacity for
rampant data collection, aggregation, and use. The legal regimes this
language of individualism informs broadly replace the substantive
promise of privacy as a “fundamental human right” with illusory
66

PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1995).
67
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).

SOCIAL VALUES,

68

Id.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 205 (identifying in the common law a
“general right of the individual to be let alone”).
70
BVerfGE 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83, Dec. 15, 1983,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/1983/1
2/rs19831215_1bvr020983en.html (articulating a right to “informational selfdetermination”); see also Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 25 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 166, 167 (1968) (defining privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others”); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 198
(stating that privacy “secures to each individual the right of determining . . . to what
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others”).
69
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procedural safeguards of “notice” and “consent”—manipulable
protections by which individuals “agree” to waive their privacy, often
with little understanding of the terms of the bargain, awareness of
future uses of information about them, 71 or power to negotiate or opt
out.72 The contours of legal privacy rights, furthermore, are
increasingly circumscribed by technological capacity to surveille,
replacing any normative or subjective notion of what is “private” with
determinations about evolving expectations about what can be
surveilled, deeming much of what might feel private as “public” and
therefore unprotected. Jurisprudence struggles to comprehend the
deleterious effects of intrusive surveillance and information collection,
as traditional doctrines regarding what types of individual injury are
required in privacy cases lead to cramped understandings of resulting
harms.73
The rubric of informational self-determination, moreover,
often undermines privacy by misdirection from the reality that
individual lives, and individual privacy, are enmeshed with broader
society.74 It obscures ways that privacy rights are deemed waived (or
never even coalesce) as a condition of participation in society, both
online and in real life.75 Framing privacy as an individual interest,
71

Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J.
385, 390 (2015) (“Individual control of data is a fundamentally flawed concept
because individuals cannot know what the data they reveal means when aggregated
with billions of other data points.”).
72
Ehimare Okoyomon et al., On the Ridiculousness of Notice and Consent:
Contradictions in App Privacy Policies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (ConPro ed., 2019) (“[I]t is unlikely that
most users comprehend these disclosures, which is due in no small part to ambiguous,
deceptive, and misleading statements.”); Lindsey Barrett, Model(ing) Privacy:
Empirical Approaches to Privacy Law and Governance, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1, 17-18 (2018) (“Few people read privacy policies, and those who do are
left with little basis to understand the uses of their data.”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1661-63 (1999) (discussing
the “autonomy trap”).
73
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016) (holding violation of Federal
Credit Reporting Act’s informational protections does not constitute injury-in-fact
“concrete” enough to confer standing).
74
Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1234 (2003) (“[M]any privacy problems cannot be adequately
redressed by relying on individual initiative alone.”).
75
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY
ON THE INTERNET 7 (2007) (“According to the general rule, if something occurs in a
public place, it is not private.”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI
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moreover, often ignores the interconnected nature of human behavior,
and of human interests. Surveillance of any one individual can reveal
a great deal about others, slicing away at their privacy without any
pretense of consent in the waiver of their rights and interests. 76 Yet
because of collective action problems, relying on individuals is a poor
means of protecting privacy as a public good. 77 The modern discourse
of individualism too often masks a post-modern technological capacity
that permits near-ubiquitous surveillance of our behaviors, our
interactions, our locations, and our personal spaces. It conceals the
ways that this capacity can be manipulated by entities whose financial
incentives demand ever-growing digital dossiers on individuals using
powerful computing in service of increasingly powerful ways to
monetize our every behavior. 78
2.

Jewish-Law Foundations for an Alternative
Path: Privacy, Social Order, and Obligation

Jewish legal sources in a variety of doctrinal and narrative
contexts speak to the cluster of issues generally associated with
privacy. These include:
(1) The well-developed doctrine against hezek re’iyah (harm
from seeing) as well as prohibitions on hezek shemiya‘h (harm from
hearing)—the closest analogs in the world of the Talmudic sages to
surveillance. While this doctrine includes rules governing information
collection, its initial mandates concern walls between neighbors’
properties and laws limiting doorways and windows in a shared
courtyard to prevent persons from gazing into others’ domains.

L. REV. 141, 142 (2014) (discussing how “24/7 data tracking, warehousing, and
mining technology” subverts protections based on “reasonable expectation[s] of
privacy”).
76
See, e.g., Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Refractive Surveillance: Monitoring
Customers to Manage Workers, 12 INT’L J. COMM. 1166, 1166 (2018) (describing
phenomenon of collecting information about one group to facilitate control over an
entirely different group); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies,
54 HASTINGS L.J. 877, 883 (2002) (discussing the “externalities of information
sharing[]” and stating that “[e]ach member of society may have a non-represented
stake in another’s disclosures of personal information”).
77
Fairfield & Engel, supra note 71, at 389-90.
78
Paul Ohm, Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 23, 2012, at
2.
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(2) The takkanah or “enactment” of Rabbenu Gershom (ca.
960–1028),79 a famed medieval ruling that prohibits, among other
things, opening mail belonging to another. Perhaps initially enacted to
protect trade secrets, the takkanah has been applied to prohibit
harvesting information from all kinds of personal communications.
(3) A range of speech rules regarding what information about
others—whether publicly accessible or not—may be shared. These
rules include a biblical prohibition against talebearing (rekhilut),
which has implications for both collecting and sharing information.
Possibly compromising information about a person’s background,
family status, or religious status, even when known by some, is barred
from public discourse.
Read together, these sources present an understanding of
privacy and a model for its protection that reflects what Cover
describes as a “jurisprudence of the social order,”80 and thus departs
radically from the usual building blocks of current privacy discourse.
They root the importance of privacy not only in the protection
of the individual, but in the set of values prerequisite for a vibrant,
functioning, and good society. The texts animate what is at stake in
the protection of privacy, and the ways that privacy harms can rend the
fabric of society. Legal doctrine locates neither the meaning of
privacy, nor the mechanism for its legal vindication, in individual
rights.
Rather, employing a system of ex ante obligations, Jewish law
establishes a set of prior commitments that help answer the question of
what behaviors are appropriate. These duties, moreover, are not
dependent on changing custom or technological capacity; Jewish law
rejects both technological determinism and the related notion of
“expectations” as delineators of privacy’s content. 81
Anonymity, moreover, is not a determinant of privacy in the
Jewish system: rules of behavior largely presume its absence—and
apply even when it exists. Privacy rules depend neither on the
“confidentiality” or “secrecy” of the information or behavior witnessed
79

See LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, JEWISH SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 111
(1964) (discussing the enactment).
80
Cover, supra note 1, at 65.
81
See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181, 195 (2008) (“[T]he reasonable expectation standard begs the question:
when does surveillance of online activities change expectations in a way that we as
a society should find objectionable?”).
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or overheard, or whether or not knowledge is later used or shared; and
they apply irrespective of the ability to show subjective personal harm.
Jewish sources often reject consent as a basis for intrusion, or waiver
of privacy duties, and privacy-protective behavioral mandates on both
the surveilled and the surveillor may remain binding even if both sides
accept the situation. Finally, even when certain types of personally
sensitive information or knowledge are publicly known, or can’t help
but be visible, Jewish law provides rules against their use or sharing.
Together, then, these elements combine to offer both a
language about privacy’s meaning—including its framing as a social
value, the harms that result from intrusions, and the understanding of
the socially-situated individuals it is intended to protect—and a
framework for employing behavioral obligations as a means for
privacy protection, with promise for combatting big data abuses, and
that is missing in current discourse.
a.) Privacy’s Meaning and Value: A
Jurisprudence of the Social Order
i.

Privacy in Society

If Warren and Brandeis’ origin story for Western privacy
doctrine rested on shielding individuals from others’ prying eyes,
Jewish privacy’s narrative arises from an ideal, even divine, social
ordering: one that places barriers in the way of visual and other
intrusions. Regarding the doctrine of hezek re’iya (harms from
seeing), the Talmud asks how such concerns arose. In answer, Rabbi
Yohanan points to the biblical story of Balaam, a seer employed by the
king of Moab who, though their enemy, delivered a divinely inspired
blessing on the Israelites after he “lifted up his eyes and saw Israel
dwelling tribe by tribe.”82 What did Balaam see that inspired this
blessing, asks the Talmud? He saw that the entrances of their tents
were not aligned with each other. And he said: “These people are
worthy of having the Divine Presence rest upon them.” 83 The ancient
Israelites structured their society to protect the privacy of the
individual or familial unit. The openings of their tents were offset,
preventing voyeuristic intrusion as well as passive or unintentional
82
83

Numbers 24:2; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 60a.
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 60a.
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glances. Privacy, according to the Talmudic imagination, must be built
into the design of community.
Grounding privacy protection in social ordering reflects a
broader rabbinic understanding that the laws of damages are critical to
a stable society. A community that lives according to the moral
principles and legal precepts of the laws of damages, say the rabbis,
will be closer to God’s vision. In more earthly terms, human beings
flourish only when their lives and property are protected from harm. 84
The categorization of laws of hezek re’iya, moreover, suggests
their nature. They are not included in the Talmudic tractate Bava
Kamma, which discusses most forms of damage and their
compensation. Rather, these laws appear in Bava Batra, a tractate that
largely deals with zoning. 85 As Arye Schreiber describes, in its
Talmudic form hezek re’iya constitutes rules “required for peaceful
coexistence between neighbors, and as part of a system of laws
enabling civilized urban living.”86 Cities are meant to be livable, and
rabbinic sources seek to balance economic productivity with human
flourishing.
Later Jewish sources further refine the question of “what
privacy is for,” in Julie Cohen’s words.87 Moses Maimonides (1138–
1204)—whose Mishneh Torah provided the first full post-Talmudic
codification of Jewish law—included the laws of hezek re’iyah in his
book of kinyan, which contains laws governing contracts and
acquisitions and, more specifically, hilkhot shekhenim, the laws of
“living as neighbors.”88 Preventing hezek re’iyah, then, constitutes one
of a variety of rabbinic laws setting up society “so that people can live
together.”89
Jewish jurisprudence reflects a similar understanding of
Rabbenu Gershom’s ban on reading personal communications and the
prohibitions against revealing information, even when it does not
1 YA‘AKOV BEN ASHER, ARBA‘AH TURIM, Hoshen Mishpat, introduction (1923)
(“The divine presence rests upon Israel through the merit of keeping the Torah and
its civil law.”); Louis Jacobs, Tur, Preface to Hoshen Mishpat: Translation and
Commentary, 6 JEWISH L. ANN. 94 (1987).
85
Mayse, supra note 22, at 90.
86
Arye Schreiber, Privacy in Jewish Law: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis, 20
JEWISH L. ANN. 179, 187 (2013).
87
Cohen, supra note 81.
88
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Shekhenim 2:14.
89
14 PISKEI DIN SHEL BATEI HA-DIN HA-RABBANI’IM BE-YISRA’EL [RULINGS OF THE
RABBINICAL COURTS OF ISRAEL] 329-30 (1993-1997).
84
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formally violate a trust. 90 As Rabbi Hayim Palagi (1788–1868), a
jurist in Smyrna (present-day Turkey), explained, opening another
person’s mail not only constitutes thievery91 but also transgresses the
biblical commandment to “love your neighbor as yourself” and its
Talmudic interpretation, “that which is repugnant to you, do not do
unto others.”92 Grounding privacy in neighborly love, behavioral
reciprocity, and divine social ordering reflects the universal Jewish
value of tseniyut—the moral core of privacy. While that word and its
cognates are used in modern Hebrew by many Jewish law scholars to
translate the English word “privacy,” its historical meaning in the
sources evokes the particular nuance of a divinely inspired demand for
personal humility. Framing tseniyut as a universal and divine value
undergirds much of Jewish legal doctrine. Reflecting Cover’s
understanding of shaping a practitioner’s moral and intellectual
development as one of Jewish law’s principal ends, promoting and
fostering tseniyut may be correctly identified as the end goal of these
doctrines.
ii.

Understanding Privacy’s Harms

It is within this social context that Jewish law understands (and
links) the inherent harms of visual intrusion, eavesdropping, and
information collection and dissemination. Contemporary scholars
struggle for a language that comprehends the depth and scope of
privacy harms,93 and American law’s demand for “concrete” (usually
economic) individual injury as a prerequisite for legal remedies
impoverishes privacy protection. Jewish privacy law, by contrast,
operates on a different understanding of harms, reflecting its
understanding of privacy as a divine value rooted in social welfare—
See Alfred S. Cohen, Cherem Rabbenu Gershom: Reading Another Person’s
Email, 55 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC’Y 99 (2008).
91
HAYIM PALAGI, SHE’ELOT U-TESHUVOT HAKIKEI LEV, parts 1-2, no. 49, fol. 69b70a. (1840).
92
Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a.
93
See Reidenberg, supra note 76, at 883-84 (discussing the way that aggregation of
information “compromise[s] the ability of any single member of society to
participate in decisions about the treatment of personal information”); Daniel J.
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 667 (2016) (discussing “broken expectations” as a measure of
privacy harms); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology,
Privacy, and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 82 (2014) (discussing
the feeling of “creepiness” as a harm of privacy intrusions).
90
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an understanding that is more capacious in comprehending how
privacy invasions harm both individuals and social relations. This is
not to say that Jewish privacy is not focused on individual harms or
lacks a vision of the individual; to the contrary, the whole community
is responsible for upholding the dignity of the individual. Privacy is a
mutually constructed dimension of society, necessary for individual
flourishing.
Nahmanides, a leading thirteenth-century Talmudic
commentator and jurist, presents an influential listing of three
intertwined values that explain why hezek re’iyah falls into the legal
category of “interpersonal harm.” 94 Not surprisingly, he lists the
promotion of tseniyut—the divine value of discretion and humility—
as a key driver of the laws of hezek re’iyah. A principal harm from
seeing, then, is the denigration of that ideal.
Yet, Nahmanides also identifies two additional harms that
provide a framework for the Jewish understanding of privacy more
broadly. First, he explains that the damage from seeing implicates the
“evil eye” (‘ayin ha-ra‘), suggesting inherent harms of illicit looking.
Second, he states that illicit looking leads to “wicked speech” (lishna
bisha), pointing to the logical consequences of seeing: the harmful
sharing and use of information.
At the core of the notion of the evil eye is that visual
surveillance (even an ill-timed glance) can alter the attention focused
on its object and the information gleaned thereby. 95 The penetrating
power of another’s gaze may be piercing and deeply unsettling for the
surveilled individual. The evil eye, moreover, can enhance jealousy
and negative feelings in the watcher. Some medieval sages
represented the hurt caused by the evil eye as a negative energy
emanating from a person’s gaze. 96
The noted Lithuanian Talmudist Rabbi Ya‘akov Yisrael
Kanievsky (1899–1985), identifies more specifically two elements of
the harm to the “watched”: bodily or personal damage and property

94

NAHMANIDES, HIDDUSHEI HA-RAMBAN 27b (1994).
See, e.g., SHULHAN ‘ARUKH, Orah Hayim 141:6 (describing custom not to call two
brothers (or father and son) up to the Torah consecutively because of the ‘ayin hara
that may come from drawing too much attention to a single family); Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Metsi’a 107a (“It is forbidden to stand by the field of another person
when it is ready to be harvested.”).
96
YONAH BEN ABRAHAM GERONDI, commentary on Pirkei Avot 2:11 (1961).
95
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damage.97 Harm to the person is manifest when one individual
observes another engaging in private matters and embarrasses the
surveilled party. Examining the nature of that injury, he discusses the
consensus legal rule that someone observed in their courtyard or home
is by definition harmed, because they cannot help but do personal
things in those areas. Where private activities are unavoidable, visual
intrusions inherently involve “bodily” harm. This understanding,
moreover, leads to “property” damage. Knowing that one will be
watched, Kanievsky writes, one cannot fully enjoy the physical
space.98 Visual trespass damages surveilled property and results in one
of two eventualities. Either the surveilled party will feel deeply
uncomfortable whenever they step foot into that space even to use it
for innocuous—though private—pursuits. Or alternatively, they will
refrain from using it and thus modify their own behavior in an attempt
to avoid the surveillance, dramatically reducing the use of one’s own
property.
The second type of harm from seeing that Nahmanides
recognizes—wicked speech (lishna bisha in Aramaic, or leshon ha-ra‘
in Hebrew)—extends the harms of privacy intrusions to their
behavioral consequences. The harms of evil speech were codified by
Maimonides, who defined the biblically prohibited activity of
talebearing as the collection and spreading of information, even true
information, from person to person. Indeed, Maimonides defined
leshon ha- ra‘ as anything that “causes damage to his friend’s body or
property, or even to cause him anguish or fear.”99 The true harm
Maimonides perceived from the spread of information was dire; he
likened the human toll of leshon ha-ra‘ to death.100 Sharing sensitive
information can have catastrophic results. Fundamentally, Rabbi
Yonah Gerondi explains, revealing someone else’s information
inherently injures that person’s ability to live consistent with the divine
value of tseniyut: it “is a departure from the way of privacy, and [the
sharer] transgresses the will of the secret’s owner.” 101

YA’AKOV YISRAEL KANIEVSKY, KEHILOT YAAKOV 23-24 (1990).
Id.
99
ISADORE TWERSKY, A MAIMONIDES READER 64 (1972) (translating MISHNEH
TORAH, Hilkhot De‘ot 7:5).
100
Id. (translating MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot De‘ot 7:1).
101
YONAH BEN ABRAHAM GERONDI, SHA‘AREI TESHUVAH [GATES OF
REPENTANCE] 3:225.
97
98
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iii.The Vision of the Individual in the
Social Order
Grounding Jewish privacy as a building block of a good society
does not exclude the individual from focus. To be sure, the Jewish
approach rejects, in Robert Cover’s words, a baseline where “the first
and fundamental unit is the individual and ‘rights’ locate him as an
individual separate and apart from every other individual.” 102 But
because its ultimate aim is the “material guarantee[ ] of life and dignity
flowing from community to the individual,” 103 the Jewish approach
offers a robust vision of the humans who comprise its community
Jewish Law posits the inherent dignity of every individual, recognizing
that surveillance may, and often does, constrain free choice and modify
individual behavior. So, too, halakhah aims to create for individual
transformation, a privileged opportunity for change that is severely
curtailed through data collection and aggregation. Rather, the
jurisprudence of social order seeks to establish a system that protects
the dignity of each individual and places the burden on the community
for that protection.
Reading the texts against the backdrop of several broader
Jewish doctrines offers important understandings of the tradition’s
view of the individual and their relation to privacy. Two doctrines
focus on the inherent worth and value of the individual: the notion that
each human is created be-tselem Elohim (in the divine image), and the
related notion of kevod ha-beriyot (inherent human dignity). These
concepts make tseniyut such an important value that guaranteeing it to
each individual is central to Jewish understanding of appropriate
human existence.
But Jewish law is a theologically inflected system of nomos,
and the link between tseniyut and the inherent value of human life leads
to sources that consider privacy through the lens of imago dei, the
human being’s creation in the image of God. 104 Jewish tradition
(perhaps strangely) grounds the notion of imago dei in the biblical
prohibition against leaving the body of an executed criminal on display
(Deut. 21:22–23). This proscription, writes legal scholar Yair
102

Cover, supra note 1, at 66.
Id. at 71.
104
See YAIR LORBERBAUM, TSELEM ELOHIM: HALAKHAH VE-AGGADAH (2004),
translated in IN GOD’S IMAGE: MYTH, THEOLOGY, AND LAW IN CLASSICAL JUDAISM
(2015) (citations refer to the original).
103
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Lorberbaum, is rooted in the belief that “the human being who is
created in the [divine] image represents a kind of extension of the
divine, and therefore its desecration and violation of the image is that
of the divine itself.”105 The notion that leaving a human body in public
view is a desecration has evocative implications for surveillance of
those still living.
Although Nahum Rakover, author of a monumental work
gathering relevant legal sources,106 attempted to ground Jewish
thinking on privacy in this conception of humanity as created in God’s
image, Arye Schreiber notes that “Rakover does not substantiate the
claim that this is the basis for the alleged right to privacy.” 107 Schreiber
is at least partially correct, but one need not root Jewish privacy
entirely in the imago dei to appreciate its usefulness in a broader cluster
of doctrines and ideas counseling for strong protections.
Schreiber and Mark Washofsky instead look to the Jewish
doctrine of kevod ha-beriyot, perhaps best translated as “human
dignity,”108 to undergird a privacy ethos centered on the inherent worth
of the individual. Schreiber notes that “insofar as privacy received
some form of broad protection, it was human dignity that was being
protected, and privacy was protected when its violation was also a
violation of someone’s dignity.”109 This value is occasionally
described in Jewish legal sources as one so important that an individual
is allowed to violate a precept of the Torah in order to preserve human
dignity.110
Jewish sources braid together imago dei and kevod ha-beriyot,
seeing human dignity as rooted not solely in societal conceptions of
honor but in the inherent worth and singular power of each human

105

Id. at 274.
NAHUM RAKOVER, HA-HAGANAH AL TSINʻAT HA-PERAṬ [Protection of Privacy
in Jewish Law] (2006).
107
Schreiber, supra note 86, at 185 n.20.
108
Yaakov (Gerald I.) Blidstein, Great is Human Dignity–The Peregrination of a
Law, 9 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI: ANN. INST. RSCH. IN JEWISH L. 127, 127
(1982); Yair Lorberbaum, Human Dignity in the Jewish Tradition, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DIGNITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
135 (Marcus Duewell et al. eds., 2014); AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (Daniel Kayros trans.,
2015).
109
Schreiber, supra note 86, at 187.
110
Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 19b.
106
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being.111 Even without accepting the theological premises of rabbinic
law, such focus on individual inherent worth as the locus of privacy
discourse has much to offer American legal thinking on this subject
and on human rights more broadly. 112
A third relevant principle relating to the individual in Jewish
tradition involves the possibility of repentance (teshuvah) and growth,
and the commitment to facilitating it. The tradition recognizes that the
possibility for personal transformation is possible only if an individual
can escape the narratives already constructed about him. Regarding
repentance, Maimonides claims: “[the penitent] must distance himself
exceedingly from the matter in which he sinned, changing his name,
as if to say, ‘I am now another person, and not the one who committed
those misdeeds.’”113 Ethical, religious, and intellectual growth is
possible only with distance from the past. If one’s personal
information endures in perpetuity, controlled by others,
transformations become effectively impossible. In appropriate
contexts, willed forgetfulness allows for individual change. 114
The commitment to preserving freedom for individual
teshuvah reflects a broader textual rejection of privacy incursions that
constrain or modify behavior and thereby undermine free choice.
Shoshana Zuboff has explained the ways that pervasive surveillance
instrumentalizes humans and “operates through the means of
behavioral modification.”115 The Jewish sources echo this individual
constraint as a serious privacy harm, reflected in Rabbi Kanievsky’s
insight that seeing into a courtyard is harmful because it changes the
behavior of the person watched, 116 (as well as in the Talmudic
prohibition against sleeping in the same room as a married couple, on
the grounds that the lack of privacy will affect their intimate
111

See YOSEF DOV SOLOVEITCHIK, YEMEI ZIKARON 9, 11 (Mosheh Krone trans.,
1986); Eugene Korn, Tselem Elokim and the Dialectic of Jewish Morality, 31
TRADITION: J. ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT 5, 14-15 (1997).
112
Asher Maoz, Can Judaism Serve as a Source of Human Rights?, 64 HEIDELBERG
J. INT’L L. 677 (2004).
113
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Teshuvah 2:4; Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah
16b.
114
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metsia 85a (describing a sage who fasted for an
extended period in order to forget everything he had learned and thus absorb new
ideas).
115
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 328 (2019).
116
See supra text accompanying note 97.
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behavior).117 As the medieval Rabbi Yonah Gerondi notes, revealing
information damages the owner of the information by “frustrat[ing] his
plans, as it says, ‘plans are frustrated when not kept secret’ (Prov.
15:22).”118 Even when past deeds are publicly well known, the harm
in revealing them is manifest in the power to undo personal
transformation. Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel (1250–1327) wrote that “even
the things that have been spoken before you not in the way of a secret,
hide them away in the walls of the heart. If you hear them from
another, do not say, ‘I heard such a thing.’” 119 Maimonides
underscores the destructive nature of collecting nonsecret information
in his definition of a person who violates the biblical commandment
against talebearing: “One who loads himself up (to‘en) with words and
goes from place to place, and says, ‘thus said so-and-so, and such have
I heard from so-and-so.’ Even though it is true, this destroys the
world.”120 Prohibited talebearing, then, involves “loading up” (to‘en)
on truthful, nonsecret information—to‘en being the same Hebrew
word used for laying a burden upon an animal. Simply collecting,
aggregating, and using truthful nonsecret information is harmful and
prohibited precisely because it changes behavior, and prevents the
autonomous decision-making that can lead to personal growth and
change.
The full force of these insights can be understood only in light
of the fundamental Jewish commitment to protecting free will and free
choice, central tenets for most Jewish thinkers from the Talmudic
period to the present.121 Many Jewish scholars see freedom of choice
not simply as a prerequisite for responsibility for one’s actions, but
rather as key to human flourishing. Rabbi Nathan Shternhartz (1780–
1840), a Hasidic leader and author of a theologically inflected legal
commentary, claimed that “the entire world was created only for the
sake of choice. Therefore, choice has very great power indeed.”122
God’s will, he writes, has been “hidden and concealed . . . within many
veils and shrouds, but He has given power and discernment to the
Babylonian Talmud, ‘Eruvin 63b.
Id.
119
ASHER BEN YEHIEL, ORHOT HAYIM no. 4 (1943); RAKOVER, supra note 106, at
53.
120
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot De’ot 7:2.
121
EPHRAIM E. URBACH, THE SAGES: THEIR CONCEPTS AND BELIEFS 255-57 (Israel
Abrahams trans., 1987).
122
1 NATHAN SHTERNHARTZ, LIKKUTEI HALAKHOT, BIRKHOT HA-SHAHAR 5:74
(1800).
117
118
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human being to cultivate understanding from this knowledge.”123 The
individual’s quest is, by exercising free choice, to sift through the
clouds of unknowing and discern the proper course of action.
From a religious perspective, then, removing choice by shaping
a person’s behavior blocks that person’s access to God. They are
forced to live exclusively within their present space without seeing
beyond its limits (or, in the case of surveillance capitalism, the limits
of what advertisers want them to see). In choosing between various
paths, the heart and mind do their work; it is thus an act of thievery to
obstruct that process, whether through the presentation of a single
option or by a studied attempt to force a choice from the limited options
in which a third-party offers.
Substantively, moreover, Jewish law holds that “consent”
without options, or decisions made under duress, may invalidate a
choice—or a sale.124 The question of choice under duress, of decisions
made with severely limited options, comes up in discussions of
apostasy, where rabbinic sources evince a deep consideration of the
validity of choices made under extreme conditions. For example,
Maimonides claims that Jews forced to convert to Islam under duress
did not, in fact, make a true choice. 125 Because they lacked a viable
alternative, and because their decision-making capabilities were
limited in the severest ways, their apostasy is essentially meaningless,
and no formal act of teshuvah was necessary for them to reenter the
fold of Judaism.
Individual choice, to be sure, is not unfettered within a tradition
rooted in obligation. Jewish sources place individual choices and
freedom within covenantal limits. 126 Central to the Jewish notion of
“privacy in society” is a recognition that the individual cannot act
entirely freely but must be consistently mindful of the impact of their
actions on others, so that their ability to lead a private life is preserved.
One cannot build a window looking into someone’s living room, nor
can someone on the other side of the fence waive his right to privacy
123

Id.
Mishnah, Bava Metzia 4:11-4:12.
125
MAIMONIDES, Iggeret ha-Shemad, in 1 IGGEROT HA-RAMBAM 25, 30 (Yitzchak
Sheilat ed., 1995).
126
This sentiment is perhaps best expressed in the famous teaching in Mishnah, Avot
6:2 (“‘And the tablets were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God,
graven upon the tablets’ (Ex. 32:16). Do not read ‘graven’ (harut) but rather
‘freedom’ (herut), for only one who engages in the study of Torah is free.”).
124
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or tseniyut; these values are fundamental and cannot be forgiven.
Jewish law thus balances free choice with limits on privacy-harming
behaviors, which, like other damaging activities, are constrained by
reciprocal responsibilities within society.
b.)

The Doctrinal Contours of Privacy’s
Protection: A Jurisprudence of
Obligation

As the previous discussion reveals at various points, Jewish law
employs duties—to build sight-protective walls, intercept
communications, or refrain from collecting and sharing information—
rather than individual rights to actualize its privacy jurisprudence. The
doctrinal contours of this obligations regime, moreover, reflect its
grounding in the Jewish understanding of privacy centrality to the
social order in at least four related ways.
First, Jewish law seeks to prevent intrusions through
categorical commands and prohibitions.
Consistent with its
understanding of privacy harms, it considers a violation of those rules
as injurious per se and does not require any additional proof of specific
demonstrable harm. As Rabbi Kanievsky describes hezek re’iya
doctrine, its obligations are enforceable as categorical prohibitions
(issura), without a showing of specific damages. Individuals are
universally obligated, for example, to erect sight-limiting fences. This
requirement, Kanievsky explains, arises from the obligation to save
oneself from sin, since it is forbidden to gaze upon what your friend
owns.127 This understanding draws on a long jurisprudential tradition
that categorically prohibits privacy intrusions. There is no shi‘ur, or
threshold amount of damages, necessary for visual trespass,128
because, as Nahmanides explains, “the eyes are like arrows,” and even
a tiny invasion shatters personal well-being and tears at the societal
fabric.129 Behavioral prohibitions also characterize the ban on reading
or eavesdropping on others’ communications. Reading another’s mail
is prohibited even when the information is not spread further, and even
when tradition does not mandate monetary restitution for damages. 130
The very act of data extraction is prohibited: even one who receives a
127

See KANIEVSKY, supra note 97 and accompanying text.
SHLOMO BEN ADERET, TESHUVOT HA-RASHBA 4:325.
129
Id. (quoting NAHMANIDES, supra note 94).
130
PALAGI, supra note 91, at 69b-70a.
128
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letter from a friend may not reveal the words of the letter to others until
being told explicitly that you may share. 131 Furthermore, the
“prohibition [against eavesdropping] applies even if knowing the
information does not cause any damage to the speaker or listener.” 132
Finally, Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liady explains, even anonymity of
the person viewed cannot excuse the harms of visual intrusion. 133 It
makes no difference whether one knows the identity of the one seen,
or whether the one seen knows that he or she is being viewed. The
prohibition remains even if the voyeur is seeing the back of an
unmarked house. In this sense, Jewish privacy law operates similarly
to the common-law tort of physical trespass, which constitutes harmful
behavior even when no traditional damages ensue.
Second, consistent with the ideal of promoting tseniyut, or
privacy-promoting individual behavior, obligations are multi-lateral
and relational; Jewish law not only imposes detailed obligations on
potential surveillors, it also mandates certain behaviors by individuals
to protect their own privacy. For example, “[I]t is forbidden [for
someone to create] an opening or a window set against the window [of
another person] . . . since it violates the quality of tseniyut for another
person to observe his deeds throughout the entire day.”134 At heart, the
very idea of hezek re’iyah is about sanctity, about moving away from
licentiousness, about the invitation to the dwelling place for God.
Similarly, as Rabbi Yonah Gerondi interprets, “[i]f you see that a
person does not rule over his spirit and does not guard his tongue
against revealing secrets, even if exposing the secret does not count as
talebearing . . . do not deposit your secret with him.” 135 The demands
of tseniyut, or privacy, require that one be exceedingly careful about
how and with whom to share information.

131

Id.
1 TZVI HIRSH SPITZ, 92 MISHPATEI TORAH 336-37 (1998).
133
SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADY, SHULHAN ‘ARUKH HA-RAV, Hoshen Mishpat,
Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon, 12.
134
Id.; see also Hayim David Azulai, Petah Eynayim, commentary on Bava Batra
60a (1959) (holding that if two parties establish buildings with facing doors or
windows at the same time, then—even though the mutual injury would not be legally
actionable under ordinary tort law because both parties have equal claims and
liabilities–the arrangement is still prohibited by the laws of hezek re’iya).
135
GERONDI, supra note 101, at 3:226.
132
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Third, and relatedly, while consent plays a significant part in
contemporary privacy and data protection law 136 in a manner
consistent with the notion of “informational self-determination,”
Jewish Law views an individual’s ability to waive protections with far
more skepticism, and rejects outright arguments that obligations
should be constructively waived by either custom, or hazakah—the
“presumption” in favor of preserving preexisting conditions akin to the
old common law “coming to the nuisance” doctrine. 137
The strongest precedents against waiving privacy protections
arise in the context of hezek re’iya138—even when parties clearly wish
to waive obligations. Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet ruled that “even if one
explicitly forgives [the right], it has no effect, since one can say ‘I
thought I could accept it but I cannot.’”139 Rabbi Joseph Karo (1488–
1575), citing ben Aderet and Nahmanides, explains: “Even if the
injured party forgives and suffers, we say to the owner of the window
it is forbidden for you . . , since every moment that you gaze upon him
and damage him with your sight you transgress, and you cannot always
guard yourself from looking.”140 Such impulses reflect a broader
Jewish doctrinal emphasis on preventing individual harm by taking
seriously the power imbalances that can plague agreements about
“consent.” As Shahar Lifshitz notes, Jewish Law does not recognize
as enforceable “oppressive contracts”—those with difficult or
unconscionable terms or arising from unequal bargaining power.141
More generally, Nahmanides compares harms from seeing the
smoke damage and the smell of a nearby latrine, 142 contexts in which
136

Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1879, 1880 (2013) (“Under the current approach, the
law provides people with a set of rights to enable them to make decisions about how
to manage their data. These rights consist primarily of rights to notice, access, and
consent regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of personal data.”).
137
The doctrine provided an important defense to those accused of creating a
nuisance and applied when the harmful activity persisted before plaintiffs acquired
impacted property. See Cassius Kirk, Jr., Torts: Nuisance: Defenses: “Coming to
the Nuisance” as a Defense, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 148, 148-51 (1953).
138
RAKOVER, supra note 106, at 67-69 (describing that consent does not lift hezek
re’iyah obligations).
139
BEN ADERET, supra note 128, at 3:180.
140
YOSEF KARO, BEIT YOSEF (1993-1994) (citing BEN ADERET, supra note 128, at
3:180).
141
Shahar Lifshitz, Oppressive-Exploitative Contracts: A Jewish Law Perspective,
23 J.L. & RELIGION 425, 426 (2008) (discussing doctrine).
142
NAHMANIDES, supra note 94, at 27b.
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preexisting harms are permitted only when nuisances do not impose
bodily or personal harms. Because protecting tseniyut is analogous to
preventing personal harm, the historic absence of a protective sight
wall cannot be excused, and the duty to take steps to prevent harms
from seeing is not waived. As Rabbi Meir Abulafia (1170–1244)
explained, “it does not matter if there is a [preexisting] custom to
exempt one party; even in a place where the custom is not to set up a
fence he is obligated [to erect one], because there is also a [categorical]
prohibition.”143 “Why are these damages singled out from the other
kinds of damages,” Maimonides asks: “Because a person’s mind
cannot handle these sorts of damages; one is assumed not to forgive
them, since the damage is constant.” 144
Fourth, while even modern scholars who recognize the “social
foundations” of privacy have nonetheless lamented the “fragility” of
such socially-constructed norms as social and technological
transformations reshape expectations,145 Jewish law rejects a notion of
privacy as determined by technological capacity and the expectations
it fosters. Jewish rules reflect stable commitments in the face of
architectural choices and shifting expectations. A millennium and a
half before Lawrence Lessig highlighted the capacity of physical and
digital architecture to regulate, 146 and policymakers adopted it as a tool
for governance “by design,”147 Jewish law embraced design
purposefully to protect privacy. Indeed, the entire doctrine of hezek
re’iyah is derived from zoning rules and building codes. Yet Jewish
law goes further, imposing behavioral obligations among both
watchers and the watched to protect privacy even when architecture
would make intrusions technically possible.
From its inception, Talmudic privacy law embraced
architecture as a tool in the service of privacy. The Talmudic tractate
Bava Batra, which develops the law of hezek re’iyah, begins with a
discussion of a Mishnah setting forth a straightforward building law:
“Partners who wish to make a partition in a [jointly held] courtyard,”
143

MEIR ABULAFIA, YAD RAMAH, Bava Batra 4a.
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Shekhenim 11:4.
145
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 957 (1989); id. at 1010 (suggesting the
“extreme fragility of privacy norms in modern life”).
146
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 20–21 (1999).
147
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-By-Design,
106 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 701 (2018).
144
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the Mishnah rules, must “build the wall in the middle [of the space].” 148
The Talmudic interpretation of this Mishnah specifically links the rule
to privacy concerns. It concludes that a wall dividing a commonly held
area must not only demarcate space but also prevent visual intrusion.
“This implies,” the Talmud concludes, “that hezek re’iyah is hezek
[cognizable harm].”149 From this design requirement, Jewish law
defined visual intrusions as a category of legal injury. As the medieval
scholar Rabbi Yaakov ben Asher (1270–1340), summarized: “The law
is that hezek re’iyah is indeed damage. Therefore, two people who
share a courtyard . . . may force one another to divide it and even to
build a partition between them so that they cannot look upon each
other’s property.”150
While architecture is a key tool for protecting privacy, Jewish
law makes clear that although physical design may allow visual
intrusions, that alone does not justify surveillance. Shneur Zalman
explains that one cannot take advantage of a lack of architectural
barriers to visual intrusions. 151 In their absence, one must adjust
behavior: where architecture does not offer privacy, looking is still
prohibited. These prohibitions are quite expansive:
There are those who say that one must take care not to
stand against (the opening) of another’s home or
courtyard and gaze into it with even an inconsequential
glance that is totally unintentional and not an attempt to
know his friend’s business. Rather, one should turn
aside one’s face when he stands next to (the opening)
of his friend’s house so that the friend will not suspect
him of intending to look in and find out his business and
become like a thief, since there is no [other] reason to
be looking in.152
A parallel example is reflected in the combination of both
architectural and behavioral obligations imposed by the law of hezek
shemiya‘h (harms of listening)153 on both the listener and the speaker.
148

Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 2a.
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 3a.
150
BEN ASHER, ARBA‘AH TURIM, Hoshen Mishpat 160:1.
151
SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADY, SHULHAN ‘ARUKH HA-RAV, Hoshen Mishpat,
Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon, 12.
152
Id. at 13.
153
The absence of mention of this doctrine in the classical Talmudic sources has led
to some minority views denying that listening harms should be considered a form of
149
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It demands that walls be built between private spaces—that is, that
technology and architecture must be marshaled for privacy. But it also
recognizes that architecture will not prevent all the harms of
overhearing—walls need not be built so thick as to be entirely
soundproof. Thus, speakers have a duty to speak in normal tones, and
hearers a duty to avoid listening. 154
c.)

The Social Good as a Limit on Privacy

Finally, the same grounding in the social order that leads to
Jewish law’s otherwise strong impulse towards privacy informs a
recognition that privacy doctrines can create harms, and the literatures
of halakhah struggle with how to negotiate the limits of these
doctrines. Struggling with the complexity of privacy is part of the
work of creating a good society.
Two sites of discourse point to the importance of
circumscribing Judaism’s privacy orientation. First, modern readers
of rabbinic sources must confront the painful reality that exhortations
to humility and modesty have justified oppression. The concept of
tseniyut has been used by some to limit women’s authority. The verse
“all the honor of the king’s daughter is within” (Psalm 45:14) has been
interpreted as instructing women to stay outside of the public eye, 155
even when it comes to performing religious rituals, on the grounds that
it would be against tseniyut.156 Medieval rabbis ruled that women may
not be appointed to positions of communal power (serarah)157—a
ruling with a long afterlife even in the modern period.158 And the
category of dat yehudit or “religious behavior of Jewish women”
reinforces compulsions to modesty and humble conduct. 159 The lived
experience of many who are forced into the realm of “the private”—
damage. See ELIYAHU MIZRAHI, SHE’ELOT U-TESHUVOT HA-RE’EM 8 (1938); AKIVA
EIGER, commentary on SHULHAN ‘ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 154:2. But most
rabbinic authorities concur that auditory surveillance is forbidden. See YITZHAK
ZILBERSTEIN, HASHUKKEI HEMED, on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 4a (2009).
154
See, e.g., MENAHEM MEIRI, BEIT HA-BEHIRAH 6 (1956) (cautioning against
speaking very loudly next to a wall).
155
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Ishut 13:11.
156
See MOSES SOFER, HIDDUSHEI HATAM SOFER, on Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat
21b; BEN YEHIEL, supra note 119, on Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 30a.
157
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:5.
158
See Daniel Sperber, On Women in Rabbinic Leadership Positions, 8 ME’OROT: A
FORUM OF MODERN ORTHO DOX DISCOURSE, 2010, at 2.
159
See 8 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 76 (2018) (entry on “dat yehudit”).
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silence, quiet, or exclusion from the limelight—reveals how the very
sources that illuminate doctrines of privacy can also be used to
construct shackles.
Second, an important line of Jewish jurisprudence rules that
some sensitive information may not remain secret if it relates to
potential harms. The contemporary rabbinic judge Rabbi Shlomo
Dakhovski allows secret recordings in very limited circumstances to
prevent damage to oneself. He follows Rabbi Palagi 160 and Rabbi
Shlomo ben Aderet in reasoning that Rabbenu Gershom’s decree
against reading communications was intended to fortify the ethos of
the Torah that people should act with modesty; the prohibition
therefore should yield when it undermines other Torah values, such as
public or private safety.161
The Talmud, in fact, imagines the Sanhedrin, the Jewish high
court, as eavesdropping on an individual reputed to have incited others
to idolatry.162
The Sanhedrin thus performs an ordinarily
unconscionable act of surveillance but may do so because a religious
value (monotheism) trumps an individual’s claim to privacy.
Modern rabbinic scholars underscore that limited cases may
warrant recording someone or opening their correspondence without
their knowledge. Exigencies may demand that privileged information
be shared with specifically delimited individuals. As Rabbi Tzvi Hirsh
Spitz explains, reading personal letters or listening in on private
conversations may be necessary to fulfilling the Torah and preserving
religion. “In these and other similar cases it is permitted, ab initio, to
read or listen to private information.” 163 These cases include parents
or educators who reasonably suspect a child or student of engaging in
illegal activities, and reasonable fear that a person is engaged in
untoward behavior.164 In such cases, when privacy is used to conceal
possible damage to society, the countervailing values of Judaism and
preserving Torah override one’s right to private communication.
3.

Contemporary Lessons from a Jurisprudence

160

See PALAGI, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
BEN ADERET, supra note 128, at 1:557.
162
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 67a.
163
SPITZ, supra note 132, at no. 92, 337-38.
164
Id.
161
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of Obligations
Jewish law’s alternative privacy path rooted in obligations
offers guidance to advocates and policymakers struggling to develop
alternative, or additional, frameworks for comprehending and
protecting privacy in this changed technological moment in four
important ways.
First, it suggests the importance of framing individual privacy
as a social commitment—the responsibility of every member of
society, personal and organizational. This would shift the focus from
framing privacy as a negative right to articulating the ways it positively
enhances communal value, 165 and offer a language for talking about
privacy relations between members of society and the bilateral
behaviors required to shape them, rather than placing the individual in
opposition to society, and framing privacy as his or her shield. 166 Such
a move has not just rhetorical, but practical significance. Shifting part
of the burden for privacy’s protection from the individual across other
members of society would alleviate the anxiety and confusion arising
from what scholars have called the “privacy paradox,”167 by which
most Americans express a deep concern about privacy but are
practically prevented from protecting it because of the reality that
participation in society leaves them open to nearly-unfettered
surveillance. Framing privacy as a set of prior legal commitments
around which architectures and behaviors must be ordered, would
instead offer stable commitments and effective tools to address this
shortcoming.
Second, Jewish law offers important language for appreciating
the totality and severity of harms wrought by pervasive surveillance
and data analytics. Current fragmented legal doctrine too often
conceptually severs informational from spatial and emotional harms,
and the regulation of each. 168 It further excuses privacy violations by
165

Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 431 (2016) (“Instead of trying to protect us against bad
things, privacy rules can be used to create good things, like trust.”).
166
PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1995).
167
See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of
Information, 347 SCIENCE 509, 510 (2015) (“This discrepancy between attitudes and
behaviors has become known as the ‘privacy paradox.’”).
168
See Cohen, supra note 81, at 181 (discussing the ways that current U.S. privacy
law and theory fail even to recognize the “spatial dimension of the privacy interest”–
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removing protection from activities and knowledge deemed to be
“public.”169 Jewish law embraces a unified attention to the range of
surveillance capacities, appreciating the interlinked danger of spatial
intrusions, information collection, use and dissemination, visibility
and exposure, and protecting privacy even “in public.” 170 The Jewish
tradition suggests a move away from formalistic legal categories that
limit privacy’s domain (in vs. out of the home; publicly available vs.
secret) to a policy focus on the types of behaviors and harms that
should be prevented, as well as the values that should be promoted.
This move is particularly important in extending privacy protection to
online spaces and new data contexts, which by definition do not fall
into traditional privacy-protected categories but pose enhanced privacy
threats.
Third, Jewish law suggests that ongoing policy debates should
focus on the adoption of categorical rules and prohibitions—both
architectural and behavioral—as the legal mechanisms for substantive
privacy protection. Policy approaches based on an individual’s
subjective exercise of their privacy rights have been overtaken by
technological advances. Objective approaches rooted in the legal
vindication of “consumer” or “reasonable” expectations face the
danger of collapsing into technological determinism, as scientific
advances alter understandings of what is possible, and therefore
anticipated.
A system of categorical substantive obligations
mandating privacy-protective practices and behaviors, by contrast,
provides a backstop against ever-increasing technological surveillance
capacity.
Finally, Jewish law embraces an important vision of the
individual in society. Current regulatory regimes largely degrade a
purported “right” to privacy into a procedural guarantee of largelythe “interest in avoiding or selectively limiting exposure” that involves the structure
of experienced space–as contrasted with the informational dimension).
169
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 477, 496-97
(2006) (discussing the “secrecy paradigm,” by which privacy becomes “tantamount
to complete secrecy,” meaning that “if the information is not previously hidden” or
“when surveillance occurs in a public place” then “no privacy interest is implicated
by the collection or dissemination of the information,” and describing how “[i]n
many areas of law this narrow view of privacy has limited the recognition of privacy
violations”).
170
See Reidenberg, supra note 76, at 141 (criticizing the ways that current
expectations-based doctrines fail to provide privacy “in public” and suggesting a
more privacy-protective approach).
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ineffective notice about the collection use of one’s information, and
fictive consent to that use. 171 Jewish law, by contrast, takes seriously
the power imbalances that can plague such agreements, prohibiting the
waiver of many privacy protections, and requiring explicit consent to
do so in others. Moreover, it recognizes the many ways that
surveillance can cause a modification of an individual’s behavior,
inappropriate in light of the Jewish sources’ commitment to free
choice. In particular, many Jewish legal mandates reflect a recognition
that surveillance, and the judgments it allows others to make about us,
can trap individuals in incomplete but constraining narratives,
inhibiting the fundamental Jewish value of teshuvah—personal growth
and change. Through its commitment to universally-applicable, nonwaivable, privacy protections in the service of free choice and growth,
and its linking of the value of privacy to divinity and to the idea that
each individual is formed in the divine image and so deserves the
opportunity for a private life, Jewish law further serves an “expressive”
legal function,172 signaling the equal importance of effective privacy
protection to every human. In this sense, ironically, Judaism’s regime
of obligation may best reflect the aspiration of a fundamental human
right—“to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or
he is a human being.”173 This right, however, is framed and articulated
as an embedded sense of interconnected obligations that are shared by,
and between, the individual and the community.
B.

Responsibility, Obligation and Environmental
Ethics

Cover’s articulation of an obligation mindset further suggests
looking to the Jewish tradition for inspiration in locating a conceptual
framework for addressing a second current threat: environmental
crisis. To be sure, legal responses to environmental harms largely
diverge from the dominant rights-based approach to privacy
protection,174 in that they are already often framed (whether in
171

See supra notes 72, 136 and accompanying text.
Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L.
REV.1533, 1535-36 (2017) (discussing the ways that privacy intrusions send
messages about society’s values about different groups in society).
173
MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE HANDBOOK 3 (3d
ed. 2004).
174
Rights-based approaches have been proposed more recently as possible solutions
to the failure to address environmental harms, see, e.g., Lidia Cano Pecharroman,
172
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regulation or tort doctrine) in terms of obligations and duties. Yet the
cramped nature of such obligations, understood as they are in the
dominant framework as exceptions to the baseline of free market
economic rights, has hindered a coherent response to climate crisis,
systemic pollution, and environmental degradation.
The struggle to develop an alternate language for
comprehending and addressing the relations between economic
structures and environmental exploitation stems in part from a
combination of the trans-jurisdictional nature of the global challenge
and the legal and social default towards market individualism where
collective action on a grand scale is instead required. These are, Cover
notes, exactly characteristics of the context in which a jurisprudence
of the social order might provide needed heft. In contexts in which
“centralized power” and “coercive violence,” are lacking, he argued,
“it is critical that the mythic center of the Law reinforce the bonds of
solidary. Common, mutual, reciprocal obligation is necessary.” 175
Rabbinic tort doctrine, while it cannot provide a wholesale
transferrable solution to environmental problems, does offer both a
robust accounting of socially embedded duties and commitment to
other human parties and the non-human world. These laws emerge
from a religious vocabulary that predates the carbon economy, and are
therefore prey to neither its assumptions nor legal limitations. 176
The dawning of the Anthropocene offers the opportunity to
reexplore a Jewish legal tradition by highlighting sources that, from a
frame of social obligation, both suggest the possibility of different
resolutions of questions about legal and moral responsibility, and
display ethical concern for the non-human environment. Especially
when read in light of the aggadah—the narrative element of the Jewish
legal tradition—and its demand for action and concern even beyond
the letter of the law, core principles of Talmudic law offer useful
starting paradigms for facing ecological catastrophe. This section first
explores the Jewish tradition’s suggestions of what a system of
Rights of Nature: Rivers That Can Stand in Court, 7 RES. 13 (2018); O’Donnell,
supra note 49; Susana Borràs, New Transitions from Human Rights to the
Environment to the Rights of Nature, 5 TRANSNATIONAL ENV’T L. 113 (2016);
Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New
Dynamic in International Law, 10 GEO. INT'L ENV’T L. REV. 309 (1997); Gwendolyn
J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 49 (2018).
175
Cover, supra note 1, at 68.
176
The section draws from Mayse, supra note 22, at 68-110.
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environmental obligation grounded in a baseline of social obligation
rather than market freedom would look like, and the vision of human
responsibility that results. It then describes three contexts, in an
illustrative rather than exhaustive fashion, to explore how this baseline
shift results in different doctrinal and ethical understandings that offer
constructive frameworks for appreciating and conceiving of alternative
responses to contemporary environmental problems.
1.

Grounding Environmental Obligations in the
Social Order

Rabbinic literature understands the laws of damages as critical
to a stable society. Human beings flourish only when their lives and
property are protected from harm.177 Peering beyond this utilitarian
approach to governing social interactions and obligations, the Talmud
refers to the Mishnaic section of “Damages” (Nezikin) as “the Order of
Redemption” (Seder Yeshu‘ot). 178 This suggests that, in the rabbinic
imagination, a community living in accordance with the moral
principles and legal precepts of damage avoidance will be closer to
God’s vision of ideal human flourishing. 179
Jewish legal sources, accordingly, attribute a very high degree
of responsibility to the individual as an actor within the broader social
landscape that includes the non-human realm as well. According to a
foundational rabbinic articulation, “[a] human being is always
considered prone to damage (mu‘ad), whether unintentional or
intentional, whether [the person is] awake or asleep. If he blinded
another person, or broke vessels, he must pay full damages.” 180
Throughout the Jewish narrative tradition, moreover, this
responsibility was understood to extend beyond the human to the
natural world. The Jewish creation myth charges human beings with
serving as guardians (shomrim), thus shielding God’s world from
harm: “And God took the humn being and placed him in the Garden of
Eden, to cultivate and protect it (le-shomrah)” (Gen. 2:15).181 An
aggadic expands, citing a verse from Ecclesiastes:
See BEN ASHER, ARBA‘AH TURIM, Hoshen Mishpat, hakdamah and 1:1.
Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a.
179
See also BE-MIDBAR RABBAH 13:15.
180
Mishnah, Bava Kamma 2:6. See also Mishnah, Bava Kamma 1:2, and the two
different explanations given by Rabbi Shlomo Yitshaki (Rashi).
181
See Norman Solomon, Judaism and Conservation, 22 CHRISTIAN-JEWISH RELS.
7, 8 (1989); JEREMY COHEN, “BE FERTILE AND INCREASE, FILL THE EARTH AND
177
178
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Consider the work of God; for who can heal that which
is damaged? (Eccl 7:13). When the blessed Holy One
created the first person, God took and showed Adam all
of the trees of the Garden of Eden, saying, Consider My
works—how beautiful and wonderful they are. All that
I have created, I have created for you. Pay heed to this
- do not damage or destroy My world, for if you do,
who will heal it after you?182
This point about human action having the power to destroy a
flourishing but fragile world is all the more acute in the Anthropocene,
and in the context of an increasing awareness that such spoliation and
devastation cannot be undone. Rather than seeking to only extract and
consume, then, human beings ought to remember that we exist only
within a network of obligations. A rabbinic midrash further suggests
that the Temple was destroyed, in part, because of our failure to fulfill
the command to guard the world from such harm. 183
This Jewish vision of legal responsibility reflects a theological
foundation that considers humanity unique among the works of
creation, through which the social fabric of legal obligation extends to
the non-human world. According to Rabbi Samson Rafael Hirsch
(1808-1888), humans are responsible for safeguarding the world:
Man, in taking possession of the unreasoning world,
becomes guardian of unreasoning property and is
responsible for the forces inherent in it, just as he is
responsible for the forces of his own body . . . . Thus is
the person responsible for all the material things under
his dominion and in his use; and even without the
verdict of a court of law, even if no claim is put forward
by another person, he must pay compensation for any
harm done to another's property or body for which he is
responsible.184
MASTER IT”: THE ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL CAREER OF A BIBLICAL TEXT (Ithaca:
Cornell Univ. Press 1989).
182
KOHELET RABBAH 7:19.
183
EIKHAH RABBAH, Petihta 4.
184
SAMSON RAFAEL HIRSCH, HOREB: A PHILOSOPHY OF JEWISH LAWS AND
OBSERVANCES no. 360 (Isidor Grunfeld trans., London: Soncino Press 1962). See
also Shmuel Chayen, Environment, Society, and Economics in the Philosophy of
Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch and Dr. Isaac Breuer (2010) (PhD dissertation, BarIlan University).
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Rabbi Hirsch’s philosophical argument suggests that liability for one’s
damage to other members of a society is triggered even without a
claimant bringing suit, because an individual is morally obligated to
make restitution and pay for the harm intendent of any legal ruling.
Humanity is enjoined from causing any kind of harm because,
according to Jewish tradition, we are singular beings that are charged
with an equally strong obligation to protect and preserve this world.
When all creatures were formed, other than human beings, the blessed
One asked each one individually for its consent to be created, as it says
in the Talmud: “They were created willingly, with their form.” 185 But
no creature was asked regarding the others, since they do not have free
choice and thus cannot destroy or lay waste [to other species]. They
will surely profit from the creation of other beings, and thus implicitly
agree to their creation, since “one may be granted merit without
explicit knowledge.” 186 But when it came to humanity, the blessed
One asked all other creatures if they should be formed because they
have free will and can destroy all the rest of creation. They agreed,
however, and all gave permission for human beings to be created.
Rather than greedily clamoring to extract the material resources of this
world and use them for our own desires, we are called to serve as
custodians of the planet. This narrative and philosophical vision is in
turn reflected in the contours of doctrinal responsibilities defined by
the law.
The competing jurisprudential values of liability and
exemption strain against one another in Talmudic discussions of tort
law, as the canon “parries and thrusts.” 187 One voice seeks ever-greater
degrees of responsibility, whereas the other demands that we limit
obligation—especially in cases of mitigated or indirect damage.
Neither value is universally dispositive. The attempt to balance these
ethical and legal principles is key to the project of halakhah, and
technical or formal analysis remains necessary in order to judge each
case on its own terms. Principles such as the exemptions of indirect
damage do provide a necessary counterweight to the values expressed
in much of the Talmudic discussions of torts, curbing individual
culpability in the service of other ethical or economic goals. The
185

Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 11a.
YA‘AKOV LEINER, BEIT YA‘AKOV, bereshit p. 26, no. 41.
187
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-02
(1950).
186
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assertion of liability, however, is a powerful voice in the rabbinic
corpus. It engenders a dominant sense of accepting responsibility—
and legal liability—for harm that befalls the body or property of
another human being.
The complicated moral fabric that undergirds rabbinic
halakhah rises to the surface with the admission that responsibility and
legal liability are not always coterminous—indeed, humans may bear
responsibility even for avoiding harms that cannot precisely be
proscribed in the law. 188 The notion that one may be “liable according
to the laws of heaven” (hayyav be-dinei shamayim) even though one is
exempt from human legislation” appears frequently in these Talmudic
discussions of torts.189 The principle suggests an admission—
begrudging, perhaps—that there are places that the law cannot go in
forcing liability or payment. This does not displace one’s ethical and
religious obligation to prevent such damage in the first place. The
concept of “liable according to the laws of heaven” offers a vision of
enduring moral responsibility—and religious duty—even in instances
that cannot be adjudicated by a human court and therefore do not
trigger a fine nor command recompense.
There is grave urgency in reading halakhic sources so that they
resonate with the broader principles of environmental concern evinced
in the sacred narratives of Judaism, the brooding “mythic center of the
Law” described by Cover. 190 Attempting to develop a Jewish
environmental halakhah requires one to read the legal sources deeply
and carefully, but it is attention to the voice of aggadah—broadly
construed—that will push us beyond the vision of Jewish law as an
isolated, formalistic and totalizing system with internal principles that
operate independently of all other values. Through focusing on God
as the source of all value and life, aggadah demands action and
See PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW & MORALITY 60 (Hart Publ’g 2002)
(“[T]he prime aim of the ‘legal system of responsibility’ is a maximisation of the
incidence of responsible (law-compliant) behaviour, not the imposition of liability
for irresponsible (law-breaking) behaviour. . . . [T]he prim[ary] purpose of legal
liability—of legal penalties and obligations of repair—is the sanctioning of those
responsible for past conduct and outcomes.”).
189
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 59b; see also Babylonian Talmud, Bava
Metzia 4b:2; Issac Herzog, Moral Rights and Duties in Jewish Law, 41 JUD. REV. 60,
60-70 (1929); ASHER GOLAK, THE FOUNDATIONS OF JEWISH LAW 18-19 (2d ed.
1922); Moshe Silberg, Law and Morals in Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARV. L. REV.
306, 306-31 (1961).
190
Cover, supra note 1, at 68.
188
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concern even beyond the letter of the law, spelling out a web of
obligations rooted in theological and philosophical values.
2.

Doctrinal Illustrations

a.) Esh: Expanding Notions of Foreseeability
The first doctrinal context involves the concept of esh (“fire”),
a rabbinic category of torts that addresses the risk of damage caused
by inanimate objects or forces that have been set in motion. Many of
its defining characteristics are gleaned from the biblical source that
imposes liability on one who starts a fire that spreads “so that stacked,
standing, or growing grain is consumed.” (Ex. 22:5).191 Rabbinic law
includes in the category of esh any moving property that causes
damage, whether it is mobilized by an external force (such as wind) or
if it “spreads” (similar to a living beast like an ox or a grazing animal)
of its own accord (me-‘atsmo), in a manner that could be foreseeable
to expected.192
The question facing the Rabbis of the Talmud, then, was how
to understand the foreseeability of harms that could be caused by a
category of matter that can be mobilized by an external force—and
therefore the extent of risks that those who start fires should consider
themselves responsible for avoiding, or damages for which they would
be liable. In a well-known Talmudic debate, Resh Lakish argued that
responsibility for fire should be limited by the general doctrine that
applies when harm is caused “indirectly” by one’s property. 193
Because the fire moves by its own power, or that of the wind, he
explained, the ensuing damage is far-removed from the original owner
and should be considered nothing more than errant property run
amok—for which responsibility is limited unless one acted
negligently.
Rabbi Yohanan, by contrast, argued that one is fully liable for
all the damage caused by fire, “because it [is analogous to the situation
in which one shoots] arrows [at another]”194—that is, an individual
191

Exodus 22:5. Biblical citations are based on the N.J.P.S. translation.
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 22b.
193
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 22a.
194
Id.
192
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who creates harm by means of fire, or anything analogous to it, is
likened to one who causes injury to others or their property directly,
with his own hands.
The Rabbis ultimately interpret the biblical verse from which
these halakhot are derived, which places responsibility on “he who
started the fire,” by siding with Rabbi Yohanan, concluding that fire is
reckoned an extension of the person himself. This damage is likened
to the “direct” damage caused by one who shoots arrows into the
domain of another,195 rather than “indirect” damage caused by errant
property.196 The resulting harm is considered an act of criminal
neglect, damage for which one is indeed liable even though it was
caused unintentionally. It thus falls under the category of behavior that
subjects the firestarter to full liability and responsibility. Particularly
when the damage occurs to another human being, the responsibility
imposed on the starter of a potent and sizable fire is nearly unlimited. 197
As a formal matter, the Rabbis defined a set of preventative
thresholds that, if correctly set in place and yet are overcome by the
fire, exempt the fire’s owner from liability. These include restraining
walls, necessary distancing between the fire and the others’ property,
and other safeguards against ordinarily occurring wind.198 Yet despite
these provisions, the heavy hand of obligation and liability, however,
is rarely lifted for esh. “Why does it say, ‘When a fire is started and
spreads out’?,” asks the Mekhilta. “The verse renders [one liable for]
accidental [harm] just like willful [damage, and] for unintentional
together with intentional.”199 The hazardous nature of fire is such that
the law assumes that an individual should foresee that the blaze may
well be carried along by wind.
195

See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 22b-23a and the comments of the
Nimmukei Yosef on Yitshak Alfasi’s digest, regarding how to define actions in regard
to their origin. See also Tosafot to Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 77a.
196
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon 1:1; and MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot
Hovel u-Mazik 1:1.
197
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon 14:15 (“If a fire advances and
damages a person, causing harm to him, then the one who set the fire is liable—for
the damage, for his loss of work, for his healing, and for his anguish— because it is
as if it damaged him with his arrows.”). If it damages his animal or his cistern [i.e.
the damaged party’s property], then he is only liable to pay for the damage. See
SHULHAN ‘ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 418:17.
198
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 6a; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 61a61b; see also Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 22b.
199
MEKHILTA DE-RABBI YISHMAEL, 22:5.
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The notion is that if the fire, despite these precautions,
escaped—even, for example, if the safeguard barriers were nonnegligently constructed but collapsed for some unconnected reason—
one should have had additional precautions in place to remedy even
such an unlikely event. “If one could have repaired the fallen fence but
fails to do so,” rules Maimonides, “then he is liable. To what may this
be compared? To an ox that went out and caused damage; he should
have kept watch over it and prevented it from damaging.” 200
The rabbinic category of esh—inclusive of inanimate damagecausing forces that harm persons or property while in motion by means
of an external force—provides a precedent vocabulary for speaking
about a wide range of modern environmental pollutants. 201 These
might include is caustic and toxic chemicals, proven carcinogens and
other sorts of harmful waste that carried by the wind, leached into
groundwater or otherwise dispersed through the atmosphere. 202 The
region known as “Cancer Alley” along the Mississippi River is a
humanitarian tragedy in our own backyard, and one that is of our own
making.203 There are many such places all over the world, however,
in far-off places that bear the brunt of the environmental degradation
produced by our industrial economy. The Toxic Substances Control
Act of 1976204 and its various amendments seek to restrain the
introduction of harmful forces into the domestic environment. But
even such laudable legislation may be insufficient to ensure that our
world remains habitable for coming generations.

200

MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon 14:4; Babylonian Talmud, Bava
Kamma 23a.
201
See the definition in SHULHAN ‘ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 418:1 (“Anything
similar to this–that is, a person’s property that moves and causes damage–is included
as a sub-category and follows the law of esh.”). Talmudic examples of the subcategories of esh (toledot) include a stone, a knife or a heavy object placed atop of a
building that falls with an expected wind and damages something when it is falling.
See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 3b; SHULHAN ‘ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat
418:1.
202
See Edward J. Schwartzbauer & Sidney Shindell, Cancer and the Adjudicative
Process: The Interface of Environmental Protection and Toxic Tort Law, 14 AM. J.
LAW MED. 1 (1988) (discussing environmental pollutants).
203
Tristan Baurick, Lylla Younes, & Joan Meiners, Welcome to “Cancer Alley,”
Where Toxic Air Is About to Get Worse, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 30, 2019, 12:00 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/welcome-to-cancer-alley-where-toxic-air-isabout-to-get-worse.
204
15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1976).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

49

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 [2022], Art. 16

2164

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

The category of esh may well include the toxic waste produced
by agricultural pesticides and overspray, by chemical or power plants,
by mining operations and refineries, and by other industries that shed
persistent pollutants or corrosive byproducts that move with the wind
or other natural forces. 205 Materials such as asbestos or radiation,
whether from active industry or construction debris or nuclear waste
that has been improperly decommissioned, are other possible modern
analogues of “fire.”206 It may be difficult to assess and determine
liability for this damage, 207 but the harmful effects and aftershocks
upon human health and property are readily visible. 208
Mechanical failures that release such hazardous materials
cannot always be avoided, and we have noted that halakhah demands
only limited liability in such cases. But many cases of acute
environmental disaster were preceded by obvious warning signs—
fallen fences, in the rabbinic idiom—that were flagrantly ignored.
Cutting corners, poor oversight, and decisions made with profits in
mind rather than public safety or environmental preservation lead
directly to calamity and exacerbate the limitations of technology. 209
Rabbi Jacob ben Joseph Reischer (1670-1733) was presented
with a case in which two individuals were riding in a wagon filled with
cotton. One of them was smoking a pipe, paying no mind to the
protestations of the second individual or his warnings to descend from
the cart in order to exercise that particular habit. When an unusual
burst of wind arose, sparks fell from the pipe and the ensuing fire
consumed the totality of their merchandise. After emphasizing that
rabbinic courts may indeed adjudicate cases of esh in the postTalmudic era, Rabbi Reischer writes as follows:
When the uncommonly strong wind came along, he
should have paid mind and removed the smoking
tobacco from his hand and the wagon. Especially since
205

Benjamin Shmueli & Yuval Sinai, Liability Under Uncertain Causation? Four
Talmudic Answers to a Contemporary Tort Dilemma, 30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 449, 460
(2012).
206
W. Noel Keyes & John L. Howarth, Approaches to Liability for Remote Causes:
The Low-Level Radiation Example, 56 IOWA L. REV. 531, 543 (1970).
207
Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic
Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1458 (2004).
208
See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 2b; see also Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 53a.
209
See Andrew Hopkins, Was Three Mile Island a ‘Normal Accident’?, 9 J.
CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS, 65, 68 (2001).
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the first person protested against him. Since he did not
do this, even though he did not blow into it at all [i.e.
kindle the flame], it is like the case of one who brings
the fire [near to a pile of wood].210 He is obligated to
pay for the damage from the best of his property. 211
Plausible deniability is refused to an individual who engages in
something as flagrantly dangerous as smoking whilst sitting upon a
tinderbox. Protestations of innocence are all the more irrelevant when
one has been warned of the potential danger of his actions. Rabbi
Reischer’s answer makes it clear that those who skirt harm by a very
thin margin must remember that, when foreseeable disasters transpire,
they are held liable by the moral voice of halakhah.
b.)

Bor: Responding to Defenses of
Multiple Causation or Cumulative
Harm

A second primary rabbinic category of hazard with
environmental relevance is that described as damage caused by “pit”
or “cistern” (bor). The class of damages assembled under this rubric,
derived in rabbinic exegesis of Exodus 21:33-34, cover the harms
caused by (mostly) stationary objects.212 Such objects are always
dangerous, and their harm is considered easily foreseeable by rabbinic
legislation. One is not held liable for harm caused by a pit that has
been correctly covered,213 but if the guarding device becomes degraded
through neglect or insufficient care, or if the protective measures were
not strong enough to guard against reasonable incursions, the owner of
the pit once again becomes liable for any harm. 214 The Talmud
includes a discussion as to whether or not one may abnegate
responsibility for an inanimate dangerous object by attempting to
render it ownerless,215 and concludes that an individual generally
210

See MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon 14:7.
1 YA‘AKOV BEN YOSEF REICHER, SHE’ELOT U-TESHOVOT SHEVUT YA’AKOV 136.
212
The verses read: “When a man opens a pit, or digs a pit and does not cover it, and
an ox or an ass falls into it, the one responsible for the pit must make restitution; he
shall pay the price to the owner, but shall keep the dead animal.” Exodus 21:33-34.
213
See Mishnah, Bava Kamma 5:6 and the discussion on Babylonian Talmud, Bava
Kamma 52a.
214
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon 12:4-5.
215
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 29b-6a.
211
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cannot place something dangerous in the public domain and then divest
ownership from it.216
Two aspects of this class of damages make it particularly useful
for environmental law and ethics. First, rabbinic discussions consider
the placement of liability if multiple individuals share ownership of an
uncovered pit, thus addressing the question of multiple or joint
tortfeasors. In most cases, the rabbis hold both parties responsible for
any damage caused by this unprotected hazard, but, if one owner fails
to cover it up and the other partner encounters it without properly
safeguarding the pit, the Mishnah rules that the second is liable rather
than the first.217 Once-shared responsibility, then, may come to rest
entirely upon the shoulders of a partner who ignores looming disaster.
Ours is a world of an ever-increasing “responsibility” gap,218
extending from vast corporate structures to the emergent world of
autonomous machines and the hazy theorizations of the torts they
cause.219 Rabbinic conceptions of bor help redress this issue, in part,
by pointing toward an ethic of shared responsibility and differentiated
liability. Furthermore, Rabbi Asher Weiss (b. 1953), a contemporary
rabbinic judge and scholar, has argued that a company is subject to the
same moral demands levied upon a private person. “Corporations
possess intrinsic legal personhood,” claims Rabbi Weiss, and “in
regard to the prohibition of thievery and stealing and all similar
matters—which are rational commandments that concern
interpersonal relations—it is utterly obvious that such commandments
are incumbent upon the company.”220 Each member or investor is
216

See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 19b; see also Babylonian Talmud, Bava
Kamma 29b.
217
See Mishnah, Bava Kamma 5:6 and the comments of Rashi on Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Kamma 52a.
218
Shmueli & Sinai, supra note 205, at 493-94.
219
Andreas Matthias, The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the
Actions of Learning Automata, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 175, 175 (2004); Geoff
Moore, Corporate Moral Agency: Review and Implications, 21 J. BUS. ETHICS 329,
329 (1999); cf. Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally
Responsible for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 27 (1983); see also
Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1924).
220
1 ASHER WEISS, SHE’ELOT U-TESHUVOT MINHAT ASHER 105, 106, 361; see also
1 YITSHAK YA‘AKOV WEISS, MINHAT YITSHAK 3; 4 MINHAT YITSHAK 1; SHE’ELOT
U-TESHUVOT TSOFNAT PANE’AH 184; cf. 2 MOSHE FEINSTEIN, SHE’ELOT UTESHUVOT IGGEROT MOSHE, Yoreh De’ah 63; Michael J. Broyde & Steven H.
Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The Corporate Paradigm,
43 WAYNE L. REV. 43 (1996).
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considered a full partner in the organization and is therefore obligated
for any damage caused by the entity as a whole. This framework
allows the hand of obligation to penetrate the shell protecting both
stakeholders and corporate actors alike from responsibility in the face
of ignorance, negligence, and outright maleficence.
A second dimension of the doctrine of bor is its vocabulary for
considering the cumulative potential of a hazard to inflict harm. A
later code summarizes the Talmudic debate as follows: “If one digs a
pit that is ten handbreadths [deep], and another comes along and makes
it twenty, and another comes along and makes it thirty—all of them
are liable.”221 Each pit was sufficiently deep to kill an animal on its
own (ten handbreadths, according to rabbinic law), and therefore all
owners are equally liable for deaths caused by the composite. The law
is different, however, if the various increments of the pit do not all
meet the requisite measure: “If one dug a pit of less than ten
handbreadths, even one less, and another came along and made it ten—
whether he dug down another handbreadth, or built up the side of the
pit—the second person is obligated.”222 Liability falls upon the
individual who adds on the necessary measure, turning the pit from an
annoying hindrance into a lethal object capable of killing an animal or
a person.
The case of the imperfectly—or impermanently—covered bor
provides an interesting way of thinking about hazardous materials and
industrial waste as well as the more obvious corollaries of open-pit
mining.223 The category of esh encompasses pollutants that are set in
motion by natural ecological forces and encroach upon the domain of
another. Bor, by contrast, includes stationary hazards that have been
dumped into public land—as well as those placed by one individual
upon another’s property.
We might also think about “pits” that are made dangerous or
deadly because of materials they hold, not just because of the size of
the hole. This might include hazardous materials that have been
improperly disposed of and superfund sites, land so contaminated by
waste and other persistent toxins that it poses a significant risk to
human and animal life. The category of bor may cover moving
SHULHAN ‘ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat, 410:14; see Babylonian Talmud, Bava
Kamma 10a-51a.
222
SHULHAN ‘ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat, 410:15.
223
See JILL JACOBS, THERE SHALL BE NO NEEDY: PURSUING SOCIAL JUSTICE
THROUGH JEWISH LAW AND TRADITION 183-84 (2009).
221
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pollutants that once had a purpose, but, when obsolete and tossed aside,
wreak havoc in the environment and its inhabitants. Items from microbeads to plastic wrappers, straws, disposable bottles, objects that move
about and become the mountains and islands of trash that sully our
waterways and destroy human and marine life. The example of the
“early pious ones” and the other rabbinic sources demand that such
things be discarded and decommissioned in such a way that they are
rendered entirely harmless.
The class of damages grouped under the rubric of bor also gives
us a way of thinking about damage caused by garbage, manure, or
compost, as well as all sorts of liquid waste or industrial runoff. 224
“One who pours water into the public domain and others are damaged
by it,” says the Mishnah, “is liable for their damage.” In a statement
Maimonides based on an earlier rabbinic tradition, we read:
All those who open their gutters and flush their
cesspools into the public domain are not permitted to
dump the water into the public domain during the
summer months, but they are permitted to do so during
the rainy season. And yet, if they damage a person or
an animal, then they must pay full damages.225
One cannot release toxic runoff or hazardous liquids, however, at a
time when they will remain undiluted and poison the common areas.
Even in the rainy season, one must take responsibility by paying for
any damage caused by this dumping.
Such prohibitions against allowing hazardous runoff surely
apply to industrial dumping and considerations of how many parts per
million of a pollutant represent the threshold of acceptability. But
might these sources also refer to other types of riparian pollution
caused by businesses or private individuals? And what about oil
spills? The disaster of the Deepwater Horizon, leased by BP and
owned by Transocean Ltd, leaked some four million barrels of oil into
the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and caused the death of eleven
individuals.226 BP paid an enormous and historic fine of over $60
224

See Mishnah, Bava Kamma 3:3; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 30a; see also
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 6a; MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon
13:15.
225
See MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Nizkei Mammon 13:13; Babylonian Talmud, Bava
Kamma 6a-30a.
226
Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability,
86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
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billion for their gross negligence. It is hard to know, however, if even
this cost was enough to cover the loss of life, utter devastation to the
environment that will be felt for decades to come. Many other oil
catastrophic spills have not triggered such a hefty fine or frantic
cleanup effort. The unspeakable cost to maritime life, to human life
and industry, goes unrecompensed.
The fundamental issue of environmental degradation comes to
the fore in Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s remark regarding the idea of
bor as it pertains to flushing out one’s gutters: “Those who ruin the
public domain and damage it, must pay! The first one [who takes
possession of the property], may keep it.” 227 This is a rather expansive
ruling, applying liability even if the parties have obtained permission
to dump. The rabbinic court has the prerogative to forfeit ownership
of all damaging things that have encroached upon the public sphere as
a fine against such behavior. One may be allowed to do something,
such as dumping garbage, but he remains liable if in doing he ruins
public land or causes damage to another individual. 228
Contemporary environmental ethicists have described a
phenomenon that they call “slow violence,” a form of verifiable and
measurable harm that is nonetheless extremely difficult to
conceptualize and address within contemporary legal frameworks. 229
The category of encumbrances long-term damage carried out over
many years, including toxic drift and oil spills, becoming cumulatively
lethal even as it remains gradual and often hidden in plain sight. Such
harrowing yet enigmatic forms of harm could, in our estimation, be
compellingly confronted through thinking with the framework of bor.
This category of damages reflects a robust ethos of social obligation,
one that addresses liability in cases of cumulative damage but also one
that spurs consideration of collective action.
These critical issues surface in a recent responsum by Rabbi
Menashe Klein, who was asked about the liability of individuals who
throw sand on flowers in a public area. 230 Klein claims that it is strictly
227

See Mishnah, Bava Kamma 3:3, and the remarks of Ovadia Bartenura,
commentary on Mishnah, Bava Kamma 3:3; see also Rashi on Babylonian Talmud,
Bava Kamma 30a.
228
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 30a.
229
See ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR
(Harv. Univ. Press eds., 2013); ERDEN EL, SLOW VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY
ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE (Cambridge Scholars Pub., 2020).
230
12 MESHANEH HALAKHOT 447. The responsum was penned in 1991.
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forbidden to cause such damage, not as an act of theft but as a form of
direct or indirect (gerama) damage. The conclusion of his ruling holds
the seeds of something much deeper, especially when combined with
the details of bor (and esh) detailed above. Rabbi Klein notes that
parents must take responsibility for preventing the children from
harming the flowers. Most human beings—and especially children—
cannot be expected to naturally accord themselves with the highest
ethical bar, and for this reason oversight and regulation are necessary.
One is not allowed to throw things into a public place that will
decimate life, destroy the efforts of others, or cause environmental
degradation. This applies to ornamental flowers, but also to crops,
drinking water, and surely to the public spaces and resources held in
common. This category of damages thus illustrates how, according to
rabbinic law, the actions of an individual are profoundly shaped by the
obligations to their social community.
c.)

Responsibility for Costs Externalized
Outside One’s Individual Property

A third and final doctrinal example—the laws and regulations
governing the impact and potential harms of various kinds of economic
activity upon their surroundings— even more explicitly frames laws
with ecological implications in terms of social order. Industry is not,
of course, forbidden by Jewish law, even if businesses create a certain
level of noise, air, or water pollutants. But the halakhah sets clear
boundaries on what level these may reach, determines where
businesses may be located in relation to private homes, and establishes
demands regarding how owners of a business must clean up damagecausing agents and safeguard others against their damage.
Communities are meant to be livable and sustainable, and Talmudic
sources demonstrate a careful calculus that balances economic
productivity with human flourishing.231 These investigations of the
potential breakdown of healthy relationships between neighbors and
the permissible proximity between businesses are distinct from the
231

See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 82b (on the special qualities of Jerusalem
and things that are prohibited because of them); MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Beit HaBehirah 7:14; see also 1 MINHAT ASHER 93; Zvi Ilani, Efficiency Considerations in
Handling Ecologic Nuisances in Halakhic Literature as Compared with Modern
Economic Theories, 16 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI: ANN. OF THE INST. FOR
RSCH. IN JEWISH L. 27-87 (1990-1991).
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realm of pure tort law,232 but they reflect a clear moderation of
individual enterprise through a thick web of social obligation.
The second chapter of the Talmudic tractate Bava Batra
addresses what might be called zoning laws, rabbinic ordinances that
govern issues such as noise pollution and foot traffic. They describe
the circumstances under which one may dig close to the property of
another person and the necessary precautions one must take in
preventing damage.233 The rabbis of the Mishnah were concerned with
the fact that certain businesses may degrade the world around it, such
as through material pollution:
A permanent threshing floor must be distanced fifty
cubits of the town. One may not make a permanent
threshing floor within his own domain unless his
ground extends fifty cubits in every direction. And one
must distance it from one's fellow’s plants and from that
person's furrow so that it will not cause damage. 234
Talmudic literature is also concerned with the environmental impact
of latrines and the disposal of waste, a necessity of human life but a
complicated issue for urban and rural communities alike. Rabbi
Ya’akov ben Asher ruled that a latrine must be placed at least fifty
cubits from a well, noting explicitly that the obligation to establish the
distance is incumbent upon the latrine’s owner.235 This responsibility
cannot be displaced with a claim to have been there first. The latrine
also causes damage because of the off-putting sight and the terrible
smell, which is why open latrines are identified as a particular
problem.236
Concerns for the social cost of air pollution take several forms
in classical halakhah, including the pollutant force of unpleasant
smells.237 Rabbinic sources display concern for the impact of fetid
232

It is telling that Maimonides groups these laws together in his MISHNEH TORAH
under the heading of hilkhot shekhenim (laws of neighbors), whereas the ARBA‘AH
TURIM and SHULHAN ‘ARUKH refer to them as nizkei shekhenim (damages between
neighbors).
233
See Yeshayahu Bar-Or, Distancing from Environmental Damages, HA-MA‘AYAN
(Tishrei 2011), https://www.machonso.org/hamaayan/?gilayon=19&id=797.
234
Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:8.
235
See BEN ASHER, ARBA’AH TURIM, Hoshen Mishpat 155:20; see also JACOBS,
supra note 223, at 186-88.
236
See BEN ASHER, ARBA‘AH TURIM, Hoshen Mishpat 155:56.
237
See 5 MEIR SICHEL, AIR POLLUTION–SMOKE AND ODOR DAMAGE 25-43 (1985).
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smells even as they are distinguished from other torts: “Animal
carcasses [i.e. slaughterhouses], graves and tanneries must be
distanced fifty cubits from a town. A tannery may be made only to the
east of a city. Rabbi Akiva says: ‘One may set it up on any side except
the west, and one must distance it fifty cubits [from the town].’”238
Insufferable smells damage the area by reducing property
values and making the surrounding region less livable. Though it may
have been less clear to city-dwellers of Late Antiquity, such odors may
be harbingers of other insidious pollutants or hygienic concerns. When
one wishes to erect an industry known to produce significant smells,
one must account for environmental factors and gauge how the wind
will distribute the smell or how the relative heat of the winds may—or
may not—intensify the problem.
Air pollution from neighboring property or nearby industry
comes also in the form of smoke, one of the most invidious and
common pollutants. The rabbinic sages were concerned about fire
damage that might result from inordinate proximity between ovens and
residences, but they were also worried about the way smoke reduces
the quality of life and causes outright damage. 239
Such issues of noxious smoke and smell continue to appear in
the responsa literature with remarkable frequency. Some of these
responsa offer additional rationales for doctrinal limits distinguishing
between industrial pollution and that produced by other uses. Rabbi
Meir of Rothenberg, for example, was asked to rule about a bathhouse
that was built near a synagogue and disturbed the occupants with the
smoke that it produces. Because the fumes were produced infrequently
(i.e., not daily), Rabbi Meir argued that it cannot be considered a
problem.240 Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet distinguished between the
voluminous smoke produced by professional ovens and that of
ordinary householders, noting that neighborhoods would be
impossible if we were to prohibit the latter. 241 Such cases are important
because they evince concern for the injured party while recognizing
the impossibility of creating a community in which all damage, large
or small, is prohibited. Living in the close proximity demanded by
human civilization entails individual compromises as well as benefits.
238

Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:9.
Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:2; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 20b; Babylonian
Talmud, Bava Kamma 82b.
240
4 SHE’ELOT U-TESHUVOT MAHARAM MI-ROTHENBERG 233 (Jerusalem 2010).
241
4 SHE’ELOT U-TESHUVOT HA-RASHBA 45 (Jerusalem 2010).
239
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In addition to the damages wrought upon homes or individuals,
the Mishnah reflects concern for the ways that certain industries will
pollute common lands and other businesses. A dovecote, for example,
must be built at least fifty cubits from the city, since the birds will
consume or damage all agricultural growth within their flight zone. 242
The Mishnah also rules that “a pool for soaking flax must be distanced
from vegetables, and leeks from onions, and mustard plant from bees.
Rabbi Yose permits mustard plant.”243 Rabbi Yose, here as elsewhere,
claims that it is the responsibility of the individual who may be injured
to distance himself or herself from the potentially damaging force; 244
a beekeeper cannot reasonably be expected to follow the small insects
and prevent them from harming another’s property. 245 The normative
opinion, however, is that all three of these potentially hazardous
industries must be distanced with an eye to foreseeable wind and other
external forces because their effects extend far beyond their border 246;
the water used in soaking flax will damage other adjacent crops,
planting leeks and onions in adjacent beds may compromise the taste
of the latter, and the proximity of the mustard plants may ruin the
quality of the bee’s honey.247
If one fails to protect her or his neighbors from harm through
compliance with these obligations, the Talmud again likens the
damage caused by the polluting industries or activities to arrows that
are recklessly launched into another’s domain—the “direct”
personally-generated type of injury that violates the strictest
obligations. Even the cautious Rabbi Yose admits that liability rests
with the tortfeasor in these cases of direct cross-border damage.
Maimonides writes as follows:
To what shall this matter be compared? To someone
standing upon his own property and shooting arrows
into his fellow's yard, saying, “I am doing this within
242

Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:5.
Mishnah, Bava Batra 2:10.
244
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 18b.
245
HIDDUSHEI HA-RASHBA, on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 18b; ROSH on Bava
Kamma 1:1.
246
MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Shekhenim 11:1-2; Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra
22b and 25b. See also the comments of Rabbenu Hananel and Nahmanides on
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 22b and Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 117a.
247
See also Maimonides’ explanation of this passage in his PERUSH HA-MISHNAH
LA-RAMBAM (Kapach ed., 1963–1967), and Shlomo ben Aderet’s discussion of the
necessary distance in his comments on Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 25a.
243
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my own domain!” We stop him from doing so! And so
too, regarding all of the distances mentioned above: if
he did not move [the object] far enough away, it is as if
he has damaged with his arrows!248
This kind of damage diminishes property values, impacts crops, and
significantly decreases another person’s quality of life even beyond the
threshold of what is bearable. In such cases, one cannot claim that “I
was here first.” Nor can one claim the right to engage in such behavior
on one’s own property.249 One must be mindful of how the things one
does on his own property impact the human life, animal life, and the
environment outside of that property. Much like the fire that spreads,
one is responsible for the ensuing damage.
The medieval Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel, thus gave the following
programmatic ruling for translating the rabbinic mandates for later
times:
For [its] ways are ways of pleasantness and all [its]
paths are peace (Prov. 3:17). [T]he Torah was insistent
that a person should not do something on his own
property that causes harm to his fellow . . . and in
respect to all those damages, regarding which the extent
to which they must be distanced was not clarified in the
Talmud, they must be removed to a distance where they
will not harm . . . .250
By this measure, responsibility for individual behavior on one’s own
property extends to the reach of the environmental costs to humans and
the natural environment externalized by each industry—in modernity,
the direct impact may stretch many miles and perhaps even across the
globe.
3.

An Environmental Responsibility Mindset of
the Social Order

These doctrinal examples, read in the context of the ethical
articulations of traditional narrative accounts, suggest starting points
for drawing important additional frameworks for environmental
248

MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Shekhenim 10:5.
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 23a; SICHEL, supra note 237, at 35-36.
250
See ASHER BEN YEHIEL, TESHUVOT HA-ROSH, 108:10 based on the translation in
SICHEL, supra note 237.
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discourse from Jewish law. Maimonides, like Rabbi Hirsch, interprets
the whole of religious tort law and the ensuing monetary obligations
as reminding human beings to take care of the objects that belong to
them and to others. The categories of potentially-damage-imposing
elements grouped under the rubric “fire” and “pit” represent forces that
are considered within our control and must therefore be carefully
controlled:
All of them [i.e. the laws of torts] are concerned with
putting an end to acts of injustice and with the
prevention of acts causing damage. In order that great
care should be taken to avoid causing damage, man is
held responsible for every act causing damage deriving
from his possessions or caused by an act of his, if only
it was possible for him to be cautious and take care not
to cause damage.
Therefore, we are held responsible for damage deriving
from our beasts, so that we should keep watch over
them; and also for damage from “fire” (esh) and from a
“pit” (bor), for these two belong to the works of man,
and he can keep watch over them and take precautions
with regard to them, so that no harm is occasioned by
them. These laws contain considerations of justice (hayosher)...251
Ours is a world of an ever-increasing “responsibility gap,” extending
from vast corporate structures to the emergent field of autonomous
machines.252 Legal ownership of objects in such a reality can be
difficult to establish in classical rabbinic law,253 and questions of
corporate liability in halakhah are an even more complicated matter. 254
Any attempt to define the culpability of modern polluters in the eyes
251

MAIMONIDES, MOREH NEVUKHIM, pt. 3, ch. 40, translated in ALFRED L. IVRY,
MAIMONIDES’ GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED: A PHIL. GUIDE 193 (Univ. Chi. Press
1963).
252
Andreas Matthias, The Resp. Gap: Ascribing Resp. for the Actions of Learning
Automata, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 175, 183 (2004).
253
See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 3b-4a, and the comments of the Tosafot
printed on that page.
254
Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business
Structures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1783 (1996). See
also 1 SHE’ELOT U-TESHUVOT HAYIM SHA’AL no. 45.
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of Jewish law will, of necessity, be forced to tackle these thorny issues
in detail beyond the scope of the present article.
Science has shown us, however, that people are not acting
despite the evidence of global pollution and the over-consumption of
resources damage our world and its inhabitants, altering our fragile
ecosystems and destroying property as well as injuring human and
animal life. Yet we have struggled to come up with a language or
mindset for compelling collective action, one that comprehends and
addresses cumulative pollution, the relations between economic
structures and environmental exploitation, and harm to our common
inheritance. Rabbinic torts offer a religious vocabulary that predates
the carbon economy and is therefore prey to neither its assumptions
nor legal limitations, offering a robust accounting of duty and
commitment to other human parties and to the non-human world. The
approach of these sources, we argue, is a founded social obligation and
thus provides a ready response to collective action problems.
Such realigning of the Talmudic sources demands behavioral
changes along with a significant shift away from a utilitarian treatment
of the natural world toward a reverence that is grounded in personal
and communal responsibility. 255 These legal sources must be read
through the lens of aggadah, thus offering a different prescriptive
vocabulary for the mandates of environmental activism from the heart
of Jewish literature. Indeed, the interweaving of nomos and theology
appears in the discussion of one of the very rabbinic torts explored
above. When challenged to offer a teaching that involved both
halakhah and aggadah, the sage Rabbi Yitshak the Blacksmith offered
the following homily:
If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns (Ex. 22:5)—
even if it breaks out on its own. The one who set the fire
must surely make restitution—the blessed Holy One
said, “I must pay for the fire that I kindled. I set a fire
in Zion, as it says, ‘He has kindled a fire in Zion that
will devour its foundations’ (Lam. 4:11) and in the
future I shall rebuild it with fire, as it says, ‘I will be a
wall of fire around it, and I will be the glory in its mist”
(Zech. 2:9). There is a tradition: The verse begins with
damage caused by property and ends with damage
caused by the body, teaching you that a person is liable
255

See JACOBS, supra note 223, at 188.
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[for harm cause by fire as if he were shooting]
arrows.256
In the Talmudic understanding, God has the courage to take
responsibility—and liability—for destruction wrought. Rabbinic law,
accordingly, goes quite far in extending obligations and underscoring
that the prohibition against causing damage is a proactive one, and
extends beyond making post facto amends. Halakhah forbids one to
cause any harm, claims Maimonides, a prohibition that remains in
effect even if one makes full restitution for the damage he has caused
(restitution being an admission of the human propensity).257
Echoing this point, Rabbi Moshe Sofer ruled that we follow the
more stringent opinion in cases of doubt (safek) regarding damages
because the obligation to protect others from harm stems from the
verses: “Be exceedingly careful for your soul” (Deut. 4:15) and “Do
not stand upon your fellow’s blood” (Lev. 19:16). 258 Halakhah even
commands an interdiction of keeping dangerous items—such as
aggressive animals or broken equipment—on one’s own property,
extending the commandment to build a fence upon one’s roof to
include protecting others from any hazardous substances or objects.259
It is tempting to foist our burden of responsibility upon others.
We may wish to blame previous generations for our present situation,
or demand that change come from the next generation rather than from
us. But, declares Rabbi Yosef Karo, “a guardian that entrusts their
charge to a second guardian remains obligated,”260 offering a
generational language for environmental discourse.
256

Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 60b; see EMMANUEL LEVINAS, NINE
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another’s land, perhaps extending the biblical commandment to return the lost
objects to preserving the natural world. See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metsia 31a;
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CONCLUSION

This essay has outlined doctrines and principles from two
different but interrelated jurisprudential realms as illustrations of how
Jewish legal traditions, especially as understood by Robert Cover,
might offer new ways to think through the pressing ethical, legal, and
existential questions of our day. Rather than naively attempting to
apply ancient, medieval, or Jewish legal sources to our post-modern
context and the unique threats of our day and age, the goal is to expand
the toolbox of ideas that are available to contemporary scholars, jurists
and activists who seek to develop a robust vocabulary to address the
dangers of climate change and the multifaceted harms of rampant
surveillance and big data aggregation. Engaging with these problems
requires moving beyond old mindsets, and Robert Cover’s writings on
obligation offer a substantive example and a foot forward of this type
of paradigm shift. Responding to the judicious criticism of his method
and interpretations by figures like Stone and Minow, we have
attempted to carry forward Cover’s work and hope to develop it more
fully in the years ahead. The present essay, meanwhile, is intended to
serve as an emblematic resource for those who seek to escape from the
narrow confines of the fly-bottle of much contemporary environmental
and privacy discourse.
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